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1. Should competition law be applied to the future? As far-fetched as the question 
might initially seem, antitrust rules have been brought into play in situations 
whereby a company tries to prevent, or at least delay, the entry into the market 
of future—potential—competitors. This issue has become strikingly prominent 
in the context of patents and intellectual property (IP) rights in the pharmaceu-
tical industry. The controversy can be summed up as follows: when a company 
develops a new drug, it will normally resort to patents to protect its investment 
in innovation and prevent other manufacturers, who could potentially make a 
similar generic product, from entering the market. But any patent awarded to 
the drug originator is finite in time, and will come with an expiry date; moreover, 
even during its lifespan the patent does not always grant full immunity from 
competition in practice. Generic producers may decide to test the boundaries of 
the protection afforded by the patent by either entering the market anyway—
in which case the patent holder would be forced to resort to costly litigation to 
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AbstrAct
Antitrust rules have been brought into play in situations 
whereby a company tries to prevent, or at least delay, 
the entry into the market of potential competitors. 
This issue has gained prominence in the context of 
patents and intellectual property (IP) rights in the 
pharmaceutical industry. Patent holders of a drug 
sometimes enter into a ‘reverse payment agreement’ 
with generics manufacturers, in order to settle 
prospective patent litigation. The sum agreed might 
also cover delaying the entry of the generic version 
of the drug into the market (‘pay-for-delay’ settlement), 
which could be harmful for competition. And yet the 
fact remains that, when reverse payment agreements 
are entered into, the generics manufacturers are not 
actual competitors of the patent holder. To what extent 
should the application of competition extend to a future 
threat which may never materialise? This paper brings 
together a panel of experts in order to analyse 
these issues, recently highlighted by the General Court’s 
judgment in the Lundbeck case.
Le droit de la concurrence a trouvé à s’appliquer 
lorsqu’une entreprise tente d’empêcher, ou du moins 
de retarder, l’entrée d’un concurrent potentiel sur 
le marché. L’importance de cette problématique 
s’est développé dans le contexte des brevets et droits 
de propriété intellectuelle (Pi) dans l’industrie 
pharmaceutique. Les titulaires de brevets concluent 
parfois des «accords de paiements inversés» 
avec les fabricants de génériques pour prévenir le 
risque de litiges relatifs aux brevets. Ces paiements 
sont parfois effectués dans le but de retarder l’entrée du 
médicament générique sur le marché («pay-for-delay»), 
ce qui peut s’avérer néfaste pour la concurrence. 
Au demeurant, les fabricants de génériques ne sont pas 
des concurrents réels du titulaire de brevets au moment 
où ces accords de paiements inversés sont conclus. 
Dans quelle mesure le droit de la concurrence devrait-il 
servir à prévenir une menace future qui ne se 
matérialisera peut-être jamais ? Plusieurs spécialistes 
se sont interrogés sur ce débat qui a récemment été au 
cœur de l’affaire Lundbeck devant le tribunal de 
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defend its IP rights—or by challenging the validity of the 
patent in court.1 And while a small number of patents 
is taken to court, half  of those which are end up being 
declared invalid. To avoid this uncertainty, the originator 
company may wish to enter into a “reverse payment 
agreement,” which involves paying the generic producers 
to settle prospective patent litigation (hence also referred 
to as “reverse payment settlement”).2 The term “reverse” 
refers to the unusual fact that it is the plaintiff  (origi-
nator) who pays the defendants (generic manufacturers).3 
The sum agreed might also cover delaying the entry of 
the generic version of the drug into the market (“pay-for-
delay” settlement), thereby unorthodoxly prolonging the 
protection of patent after its inevitable expiration.
2.  Schemes of this nature are bound to set off  alarm 
bells in the mind of the antitrust erudite. Delaying the 
entry of would-be competitors would almost certainly 
entail pushing back the benefits typically derived from a 
competitive market, the very ones that competition law 
was designed to protect. And yet the fact remains that, 
when reverse payment agreements are entered into, the 
generic manufacturers are not actual competitors of the 
patent holder. Unless they infringe the IP rights of the 
originator, the generic version of the drug will only hit 
the market once the basic patent is no longer in force. 
To what extent, therefore, should the application of 
competition extend to a future threat which may never 
materialise?
3.  To be clear, the risks for competition inherent to 
pay-for-delay agreements are undoubtedly substantial. 
The availability of the generic drug would be expected 
to benefit consumers by increasing choice and bringing 
prices down. Beyond reverse payment settlements, 
drug manufacturers have been known to inflate prices 
when they do not face competition and/or their prices 
are not regulated. For instance, in 2016 the companies 
Pfizer and Flynn Pharma were fined £90 million by the 
UK’s Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) for 
charging excessive prices, following a colossal 1,600% 
increase in the cost of phenytoin sodium capsules the 
moment the price ceased to be subject to regulation.4 
To make matters worse, this may well come out of the 
taxpayers’ pockets, since medicines are frequently covered 
by national health-care systems. This makes the potential 
negative consequences of anticompetitive behaviour in 
this sector particularly far-reaching and worrying. In 
this context, it is not surprising that antitrust authorities 
pay special attention to the actions of pharmaceutical 
companies, and that reverse payments are looked upon 
with suspicion.
1 D.  Geradin, D.  H. Ginsburg and G.  Safty, Reverse Payment Patent Settlements in the 
European Union and the United States, George Mason University Legal Studies Research 
Paper Series LS 15–22, 2015, pp. 1–2.
2 D.  H.  Ginsburg and D.  E. Haar, Resolving Conflicts between Competition and Other 
Values: The Roles of  Courts and Other Institutions in the US and the EU, in P. Lowe and 
M. Marquis, European Competition Annual 2012 (Hart, 2014), p. 426.
3 D. Geradin, et al., supra note 1.
4 Case CE/9742-13 Unfair Pricing in Respect of  the Supply of  Phenytoin Sodium Capsules in 
the UK, 7 December 2016.
4. In recent years, various antitrust enforcers have specifi-
cally considered the drug makers’ pay-for-delay practices. 
Their verdicts are generally unfavourable, but in different 
degrees. Therefore, the extent to which such arrangements 
are unlawful very much depends on the specific jurisdic-
tion in which the agreements are investigated. In the US, 
the leading case is Actavis.5 The Federal Trade Commis-
sion originally tried to apply a presumption of illegality 
to reverse payment agreements. The Supreme Court, 
while ruling that said arrangements could indeed be chal-
lenged under antitrust law, established that they should 
be subject to the rule of reason analysis. Notably, the 
recent ruling of the EU General Court (GC) in Lundbeck 
suggests that a harsher treatment will be applied under EU 
competition law. It confirms that these agreements are to 
be considered restrictions of competition by object under 
Article 101(1) TFEU.6 This position had been defended 
by the European Commission in its own decision against 
the pharmaceutical company, which the GC ratified in 
its judgment.7 A similar stance was also adopted in the 
UK by the CMA when it imposed a £45  million fine 
on GlaxoSmithKline for paying £50  million to generic 
producers of the drug paroxetine to delay their entry into 
the UK market,8 in breach of the Chapter I Prohibition 
and Article 101(1) TFEU. In the ongoing (as of 1 March 
2017) appeal before the Competition Appeals Tribunal 
(CAT), the CMA stated that such practices are “by nature 
antithetical to the competitive process.”9 Moreover, on 
3 March 2017, the CMA issued a new statement of objec-
tions against drug makers Concordia and Actavis for 
entering into an agreement to discourage the former from 
making a competing version of the latter’s hydrocorti-
sone tablets. Actavis has also been accused of abusing its 
dominant position by delaying Concordia’s entry into the 
market.10
5. Clearly, there is no question that these agreements are 
an important concern for antitrust authorities. What 
makes the above decisions particularly interesting is 
that they rely almost entirely on the fact that the generic 
producers are potential competitors of the originator 
firm who is in possession of the patent. The concept 
of potential competitors and its boundaries has thus 
gained a pivotal role in the application of competition 
law to reverse payment agreements. Some of the guidance 
issued by the Commission specifies that potential compe-
tition exists when a company “would be likely, on realistic 
grounds, to undertake the necessary additional investments 
5 Case FTC v. Actavis, Inc. (2013) 570 US, 133 S Ct 2223.
6 Case  T-472/13 H. Lundbeck A/S and Lundbeck Ltd v. European Commission 
EU:T:2016:449.
7 Commission Decision, Case AT.39226 — Lundbeck C(2013) 3803 final.
8 CMA Press Release, CMA Fines Pharma Companies £45 Million, 12 February 2016.
9 M. McLennan, CMA: Pay-for-Delay Settlement “Restrictive in Its Own Right,” 





10 CMA Press Release, CMA Alleges Anti-Competitive Agreements for Hydrocortisone 
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or other necessary switching costs to enter the relevant 
product and geographic market(s) within a reasonably 
short period of time in response to a small and permanent 
increase in relative prices.”11 A purely theoretical possi-
bility of entry would not suffice to sustain a finding of 
potential competition. In Lundbeck, the GC points to 
the specific reasons why, in this case, it considers generic 
producers to be potential competitors. In particular, 
it points out that it was not clear that their entry into 
the market before the expiration of the patent would 
“undoubtedly [have] infringed the applicants’ patents,” 
nor that these patents “would certainly have withstood the 
claims of invalidity” if  the generic producers had indeed 
challenged them.12 
6. The somewhat generous interpretation of the concept 
might undoubtedly prove helpful for effectively tackling 
arrangements which have the power to cause significant 
harm and which, should generic producers not qualify 
as potential competitors, would be virtually impossible 
to attack. However, the GC’s position goes too far for 
some, and has already been subject to scholarly criticism. 
Ibáñez  Colomo, for instance, wonders whether the 
notion of potential competition can really be stretched as 
far as to include situations in which a patent would have 
to be infringed in order to compete. He claims, shrewdly 
resorting to the paradox of Schrödinger’s cat, that “the 
position taken by the General Court is tantamount to 
saying that  Schrödinger’s cat  is alive because it  may  be 
alive. A generic producer is a potential competitor, in other 
words, because it may successfully enter the market.”13
11 See, for instance, Commission Notice — Guidelines on the Application of  Article 
[101TFEU] to Technology Transfer Agreements (2004) OJ C 101/02, § 67.
12 GC’s Lundbeck judgment, supra note 6, § 120.
13 P.  Ibáñez Colomo, GC Judgment in Case  T-472/13, Lundbeck v Commis-
sion: on Patents and Schrödinger’s Cat, Chillin’ Competition blog, 
13  September 2016, online at https://chillingcompetition.com/2016/09/13/
gc-judgment-in-case-t-47213-lundbeck-v-commission-on-patents-and-schrodingers-cat. 
7.  The controversy is served, and it is set to lead to a 
succulent discussion. In the context of this debate, the 
present paper brings together an exceptional panel of 
renowned experts in order to analyse the fascinating 
issues highlighted by the Lundbeck case in relation to 
the concept of potential competition. It begins with a 
thought-provoking contribution from Dr. Niamh Dunne 
of the School of Law of the London School of Economics 
exploring the logic behind the protection of future compet-
itors, and engaging in a meticulous, critical assessment of 
the concept as envisaged by the European Commission 
and the European courts. Thereafter, Mr. Knut Fournier 
of Leiden University and the Hong Kong Competition 
Association provides a fresh, practical and comparative 
perspective by exploring the developments in the US in 
relation to the notion of potential competition. Professor 
Sofia O.  Pais of the Portuguese Catholic University of 
Porto specifically covers the intersection between compe-
tition and patent law, that is, the paramount issues raised 
by Lundbeck relating to IP rights, and in particular in 
the light of Lemley and Shapiro’s theory of probabil-
istic patents. Finally, Dr.  Derek  Ritzmann, Senior Vice 
President of Compass Lexecon Hong Kong and former 
Chief Economist of the Hong Kong Competition 
Commission, enriches the discussion by going beyond a 
purely legal analysis and giving his take on the recent EU 
developments through the lens of an economist. 
8. I am extremely grateful to all of them for their excellent 
and timely contributions. Their pieces raise fundamental 
questions for the scholarly community to consider in 
relation to the boundaries of the concept of potential 
competition. The assorted views expressed in this article 
and the suggestions put forward make up a unique, 
outstanding ensemble, and I am delighted with the result 
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Assistant Professor, London School of Economics and Political Science
I. Introduction
1. “[T]he art of playing a losing hand slowly” is how phar-
maceutical company Lundbeck described efforts to 
forestall generic competition following expiry of patent 
protection for its lucrative antidepressant, citalopram.1 
By “buying-off”2 would-be rivals before they attempted 
entry, Lundbeck ensured that perceived potential compe-
tition failed to materialise into actual competitive chal-
lenges, thus resisting the downward pressure on prices 
that would have ensued. In doing so, however, it drew the 
ire of the European Commission, which condemned such 
blatant efforts to suppress expected future competition as 
a restriction by object contrary to Article 101(1) TFEU. 
This contribution explores the concept of potential 
competition, forefront in the Lundbeck decision and its 
appeal before the General Court, considering the rationale 
for and appropriate scope of the protection of prospective 
or nascent sources of competitive constraints within the 
broader framework of the EU competition rules. 
2.  EU competition law protects a myriad of (largely) 
complementary interests linked to the market process: of 
competitors, of customers, and furthermore of “compe-
tition as such.”3 Unsurprisingly, the notion of effective 
and free-functioning competition is integral to its various 
prohibitions. Broadly speaking, antitrust infringements 
can be divided between those which serve to exclude 
rivals, thus increasing the market power of remaining 
actors, and those which harness such power to exploit 
consumers directly. The concept of potential competition 
adds an additional complication to this broad dichotomy: 
to what extent should EU competition law further-
more peer into the future and concern itself  with present 
conduct that might inhibit conceivable future compe-
tition that could—but not necessarily will—otherwise 
arise? Competition itself  is an inherently dynamic 
process, premised upon constant cycles of market entry, 
1 Commission Decision C(2013) 3803 final of  19 June 2013 relating to a proceeding under 
Article 101 [TFEU] and Article 53 of  the EEA Agreement (Case AT.39226 — Lundbeck), § 187.
2 Case  T-472/13 H. Lundbeck A/S and Lundbeck Ltd v. European Commission 
EU:T:2016:449 (hereafter “Lundbeck”), § 352.
3 See, e.g., Cases C-95/04 P British Airways v. Commission EU:C:2007:166, § 106; C-501/06 
P GlaxoSmithKline Services v. Commission EU:C:2009:610, §  63; and T-461/07—Visa 
Europe and Visa International Service v. Commission EU:T:2011:181, § 126.
exit and innovation. Yet the concept of potential compe-
tition is a somewhat contingent and hypothetical one, 
and thus presents a slippery target for antitrust enforce-
ment. Disentangling the intrinsic from the purely specu-
lative in the antitrust treatment of potential competition 
is thus the ultimate focus of this contribution. 
II. Potential 
competition in and 
after Lundbeck
3. Potential competition is firmly established as a relevant 
parameter within the context of Article  101 TFEU. 
In scrutinising the conditions of competition within which 
any agreement is to be implemented, this assessment 
must be based: “not only on existing competition between 
undertakings already present on the relevant market but 
also on potential competition, in order to ascertain whether 
(…) there are real concrete possibilities for the undertak-
ings concerned to compete among themselves or for a new 
competitor to penetrate the relevant market and compete 
with the undertakings already established.”4 
4. To demonstrate such “real concrete possibilities,”5 the 
likelihood of prospective competition must be more than 
“purely theoretical” and not “unrealistic.”6 Entry must 
therefore represent an “economically viable strategy” 
for the would-be competitor7—although, as Lundbeck 
illustrates, this requirement must be decoupled from the 
question of whether it might be more profitable to refrain 
from entry considering anticompetitive incentives to do 
so. A finding of potential competition does not depend, 
moreover, on any prior existence or absence of compe-
tition within the market; it is sufficient to demonstrate 
simply that there is scope for further competition.8 
4 Case T-374/94 European Night Services v. Commission EU:T:1998:198, § 137.
5 Lundbeck, § 100.
6 Visa, § 85.
7 Visa, § 167; and Lundbeck, § 100.
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5. The key criterion is thus whether the potential compet-
itor has an ability to enter the market; conversely, its 
intention to do so (or otherwise) is not determinative,9 
nor is it necessary to establish that entry would inevi-
tably have been successful.10 Accordingly, the crux of 
the notion is that, even absent a current presence on 
the market, the realistic possibility of new entry acts as 
a competitive constraint on existing actors.11 The case 
law thus recognises that the present manifestation of 
potential competition “may be no more than the existence 
of an undertaking outside that market”—provided that 
that undertaking would be likely to enter the relevant 
market if  it became a more attractive proposition in 
economic terms.12 To qualify as a proximate source of 
competitive pressure, however, this necessarily implies 
that such entry could take place sufficiently quickly for 
the threat of potential entry to influence the conduct of 
incumbent market participants.13 
6. Applying these principles in Lundbeck, the Commis-
sion held that “pay-to-delay” agreements with generic 
undertakings not yet present in the citalopram market 
constituted “by object” restrictions under Article 101(1) 
TFEU, insofar as the arrangements directly sought to 
prevent the competitive potential of those undertakings 
from being realised. The finding of potential competition 
thus hinged on the “dynamic competitive process” that is 
unleashed by the pending expiry of an active pharmaceu-
tical ingredient (API) patent held by an originator under-
taking.14 This involves, inter alia, efforts to develop viable 
production processes for generic versions of the relevant 
medicinal product, to secure marketing authorisation, 
and to establish a distribution network, in a race to be 
“first to market” when generic entry becomes permis-
sible.15 The Commission’s understanding of potential 
competition even extended to patent challenges and “at 
risk” entry which might prompt patent-infringement 
litigation, on the basis that such activities, although 
dubious from an IP law perspective, are part and parcel 
of the competitive landscape of the generic pharmaceu-
ticals sector.16 This finding was reinforced by the fact 
that generic undertakings had already made consider-
able investments in preparation for entering the citalo-
pram market, prior to the impugned settlements.17 Thus, 
generic undertakings were perceived as a competitive 
threat and thus exerted pressure on Lundbeck and other 
undertakings operating in the same market long prior to 
actual entry.18 
9 Lundbeck, § 101.






16 Lundbeck, §§ 96–97 and 128.
17 Lundbeck, §§ 124 and 131.
18 Lundbeck, § 144 and 163.
7.  Notably, the Commission supported its finding of 
potential competition by reference to the very fact that 
Lundbeck had concluded the impugned agreements with 
various would-be generic competitors precisely to avoid 
this perceived threat of entry.19 The logic here might 
be criticised as somewhat circular, insofar as the mere 
existence of the suspect agreements apparently confirms 
their anticompetitive nature. Yet, intuitively, it is both 
plausible and pragmatic to infer from expensive and 
risky efforts to avoid even the prospect of a particular 
market outcome that there are significant vested interests 
at stake, and that the undertaking concerned has much to 
lose should the adverse result materialise. Moreover, the 
validity of the Commission’s finding of potential compe-
tition was not undermined by the fact that it remained 
entirely possible that entry might not succeed in practice 
if, for instance, Lundbeck successfully deployed its 
process patents to exclude generic production.20
8. Given the significant consumer harm that can result 
from pay-to-delay arrangements—in, furthermore, a 
market context where public interest considerations 
extend beyond mere questions of efficiency21—this 
contribution does not dispute the ultimate finding in 
Lundbeck that the agreements constituted an anticom-
petitive restriction within the meaning of Article  101 
TFEU. Nevertheless, the legal framing of the restric-
tive conduct at issue is remarkable for two reasons. First, 
the Commission treated the various settlements as by 
object restrictions, meaning that it was unnecessary to 
establish that they had the effect in practice of preventing 
or limiting potential competition from being realised. In 
so doing, it drew heavily on the precedent of the BIDS 
case, in which the Court of Justice accepted that a hori-
zontal agreement to “buy-off” existing competition—
accompanied by restraints intended to foreclose the 
potential for future new entry—constituted a restriction 
by object.22 Lundbeck nonetheless represents a significant 
extension of the approach articulated in BIDS insofar 
as, with one limited exception, the counterparties to 
the pay-to-delay agreements did not yet compete in the 
markets concerned, nor was there any guarantee that 
entry, if  attempted, would have been successful. As an 
object restriction, the buying-off  of potential competi-
tion is therefore a step further removed from the existing 
competition process, and thus constitutes a rather more 
speculative or uncertain theory of harm.23 The apparent 
prioritisation of potential competition within Lundbeck 
thus raises the question of why, and in what circum-
stances, an (essentially hypothetical) claim of potential 
competition ought to be protected, proactively, under 
competition law.
19 Lundbeck, §§ 103 and 181.
20 Lundbeck, § 203.
21 The broader context of  pay-to-delay settlement is discussed in, e.g., European Commis-
sion, Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry. Final Report, adopted 8 July 2009.
22 Case C-209/07 Competition Authority v. Beef  Industry Development Society (BIDS) [2009] 
4 CMLR 6.
23 Critiquing the “by object” approach in this context, see, e.g., S.  Gallasch, Activating 
Actavis in Europe — The Proposal for a “Structured Effects-Based” Analysis for Pay-to-
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9. Second, the decision raises interesting questions with 
respect to the intersection between antitrust and intel-
lectual property, and in particular, the manner in which 
the latter may inform or even predetermine the proper 
outcome of the competition process, and, consequently, 
the scope for potential competition. Notably, in Lundbeck 
both Commission and Court refused to accept that the 
mere existence of an IP right, the scope of which osten-
sibly encompasses the market activity subject to a claim 
of potential competition, is determinative of whether and 
to what extent such competition can be said to arise. Such 
an approach appears to have been heavily informed by the 
specific dynamics of competition within pharmaceutical 
markets, marked by bold and often risky behaviour by 
generic undertakings, alongside extensive and arguably 
excessive levels of patent protection granted to origina-
tors, particularly in respect of manufacturing processes. 
Yet, to hold that potential competition can exist even 
where its realisation would—or at least might—involve 
violation of validly maintained IP rights suggests a 
broad and, some might argue, overly ambitious under-
standing of the concept.24 This, again, prompts questions 
regarding the nature and value of potential competition 
within the broader framework of the EU antitrust rules.
III. Explaining 
potential competition
10. All of which brings us to the core focus of this contri-
bution—namely, the extent to which competition law 
can and should safeguard potential competition. On 
the one hand, protecting potential competition might be 
viewed as an indissociable component of the protection 
of “competition as such”: the idea that markets should 
remain open and contestable, both to existing compet-
itors and possible new entrants. Both Articles  101 and 
102 TFEU consider not only the question of short-
term competition but also longer-term implications 
of allegedly anticompetitive conduct;25 the concept 
of potential competition is a necessary component of 
any such assessment. On the other hand, protection of 
potential competition might be viewed as the ultimate 
“moving target”26 within antitrust, insofar as it requires 
undertakings to take account of the likely impact of their 
economic activity not only on existing rivals, but further-
more in terms of its possible effects on hypothetical 
future rivals. To the extent that EU competition law has 
been vulnerable to criticism, merited or otherwise, that 
24 See, e.g., R.  Subiotto and J.  Diaz, Lundbeck v Commission: Reverse Payment Patent 
Settlements as Restrictions of  Competition by Object, 8 Journal of  European Competi-
tion Law & Practice 27 (2017), 28, critiquing “a lack of  receptiveness to the specificities of  
the pharmaceutical industry, the importance of  intellectual property rights, and the imperfect 
patent enforcement system.”
25 Reflected, for example, in the exemption for “technical progress” under Article  101(3) 
TFEU, and references to the balancing of  incentives for innovation and investment in 
European Commission, Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying 
Article 82 of  the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings 
(OJ C 45/7, 24.2.2009) (hereafter “Enforcement Priorities”), §§ 75 and 87.
26 Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. linkLine Communications, Inc., 555 U.S. 438 (2009), Opinion 
of  Roberts CJ.
it places undue emphasis on protection of competitors 
at the expense of broader considerations of consumer 
welfare, adding additional obligations towards possible 
prospective future rivals might be seen to add greater fuel 
to this fire. In what follows, we consider how the notion 
of potential competition aligns with and may be influ-
enced by the general conceptual framework governing 
the EU antitrust rules, including questions regarding 
the nature of legitimate competition, the inherent uncer-
tainty of the competition process, and the contemporary 
focus on efficiency-enhancing behaviour.
1. Competition on the merits
11. We begin with the nebulous notion of “competition on 
the merits,”27 to be distinguished from “methods different 
from those which condition normal competition.”28 Compe-
tition on the merits may result in a prima facie diminu-
tion of potential competition, insofar as a highly compet-
itive market may be less attractive to new entrants who 
perceive that there are fewer opportunities for profit to 
be made. At least in theory, however, “competitors that 
are forced to exit the market due to fierce competition, 
rather than anticompetitive behaviour, are not protected” 
by competition law.29 The same logic (or scepticism) must 
obviously apply to potential competition. Prospective 
competitors dissuaded from entry where existing levels of 
competition are high should receive no protection under 
the competition rules to the extent that their complaint is, 
in essence, that the market structure results in a prioriti-
sation of allocative over productive efficiency. 
12.  This conclusion is implicit in the treatment of 
potential competition in Lundbeck, where the court 
spoke in terms of a likelihood of entry “if the market 
becomes more attractive.”30 Where it becomes less 
attractive due to increasing levels of actual competi-
tion, the likelihood of entry decreases, and the competi-
tive pressure exerted by ostensible potential competitors 
recedes. From an antitrust perspective, this diminution in 
overall competitive constraints within the marketplace is 
problematic only to the extent that entry has become less 
appealing due to “non-normal” methods of competition, 
whether resulting from collusion, such as the buying-off  
of potential competition at issue in Lundbeck, or from 
exclusionary unilateral conduct, where for instance the 
dominant undertaking raises barriers to entry by potential 
competitors. A lessening of potential competition is thus 
a concern for competition policy where it stems from 
artificial interference with the otherwise organic compe-
tition process: most obviously, where potential compet-
itors are bullied or bribed by current market partici-
pants to refrain from entry. Lundbeck thus deployed the 
notion of “disproportionality” to separate permissible 
27 Case C-457/10 P AstraZeneca AB and AstraZeneca plc v. European Commission 
EU:C:2012:770, § 75.
28 Case C-85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v. Commission EU:C:1979:36, § 91.
29 Opinion of  Advocate General Wahl in Case C‑413/14 P Intel Corporation Inc. v. European 
Commission EU:C:2016:788, § 41.
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patent settlements from anticompetitive “pay-to-delay” 
arrangements,31 language also found within the abuse of 
dominance case law.32
13.  On the other hand, one of the more remarkable 
aspects of the Lundbeck decision is its apparent accept-
ance that potential competition, to be deserving of 
antitrust protection, need not need itself  be merito-
rious as such. This follows from the finding that “at risk” 
entry—namely, where the generic undertaking launches 
a competing product in circumstances which arguably 
involve breach of the originator’s IP rights—nonethe-
less constitutes “the expression of potential competition,” 
at least where it has not yet been definitively established 
that the outstanding patent is infringed by the competing 
product.33 Thus, contrary to the defendant’s (admittedly 
self-serving) arguments in Lundbeck,34 the protections of 
EU competition law are not restricted to unequivocally 
“lawful competition” as such. Any deliberate efforts to 
suppress potential competition are therefore likely to fall 
foul of Articles 101 or 102 TFEU, even if  those would-be 
competitors might themselves encounter other legal 
hurdles to market participation should the anticipated 
competition in fact materialise. 
2. Inherent uncertainty 
of the market process
14.  A second relevant consideration is the concept 
inherent within EU competition law that “each economic 
operator must determine independently the policy which it 
intends to adopt” on the market.35 This foundational tenet 
draws on the dynamic nature of the competition process, 
relying upon the spontaneous interaction of market 
actors to generate socially optimal outcomes. As  the 
case law emphasises, this does not require that under-
takings conduct themselves in a manner that is deliber-
ately unmindful of the activities of other market partic-
ipants, be they competitors or customers.36 Indeed, such 
an approach would stand at odds with the fundamental 
underpinnings of the competition process, premised as 
it is upon intelligent adaption by market actors to the 
existing or anticipated conduct of competitors.37 Compe-
tition law nonetheless seeks to proscribe and prevent 
behaviour that eliminates the risks and uncertainty 
31 Lundbeck, § 354.




35 See, e.g., Case C-40/73 Coöperatieve Vereniging “Suiker Unie” UA and others v. Commission 
EU:C:1975:174, § 173, and Case C-209/07 Competition Authority v. Beef  Industry Devel-
opment Society Ltd and Barry Brothers (Carrigmore) Meats Ltd. (BIDS) EU:C:2008:643, 
§ 34.
36 Suiker Unie, § 174.
37 Suiker Unie, § 174.
inherent in the competitive process:38 that is, conduct 
which seeks to replace the dynamism and unpredict-
ability of the market mechanism with outcomes deter-
mined, in whole or part, through private ordering. This 
includes efforts to limit the possibility of new entry that 
may undermine the existing position of current market 
participants. 
15.  This concept has been well explored in the context 
of Article  101(1) TFEU, which is intended to prohibit 
any form of coordination which “deliberately substitutes 
practical cooperation between undertakings for the risks 
of competition.”39 This notion was central to the BIDS 
decision, in which the court effectively held that the 
proposed market reorganisation would permit remaining 
participants to reduce or even eliminate the competitive 
pressures exerted by current and potential future market 
actors.40 Absent the impugned agreement, economies 
of scale could be realised only through merging—also 
subject to antitrust scrutiny—or intensifying of commer-
cial rivalry.41 With the BIDS agreement in place, however, 
those undertakings avoided the uncertainty and potential 
disruption of the competition process; and in particular, 
each eliminated the risk that it might, ultimately, prove to 
be one of the “losers” rather than successful “winners” 
emerging from that intrinsically unpredictable process. 
16. As noted, this logic was extended in Lundbeck to cover 
horizontal agreements that expressly precluded entry 
by potential competitors.42 The result, in those circum-
stances, was that the incumbent succeeded in heading off  
various credible competitive threats that could conceiv-
ably have challenged its established market position, 
which would, almost inevitably, have led to a fall in retail 
prices as Lundbeck responded to the increased compe-
tition generated by generic entry, whether legitimate 
or otherwise.43 Although the General Court acknowl-
edged that efforts to manage and minimise such uncer-
tainty were understandable from a commercial perspec-
tive, it was at pains to emphasise that undertakings 
remain bound by the competition rules in so doing.44 
In particular, Lundbeck had essentially “bought” greater 
market stability through significant value transfers to 
potential competitors45—payments which corresponded 
not to the strength of the underlying patents in dispute, 
but rather to the profits anticipated by the generic 
undertakings if  they had entered the market.46 In this 
manner, both the Commission and Court concluded that 
Lundbeck was, in essence, seeking to prolong enjoyment 




42 In particular, Lundbeck, § 424.
43 Lundbeck, §§ 377–385.
44 Lundbeck, §§ 377 and 380.
45 Lundbeck, § 382.
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of its monopoly profit of “a quiet life”47 by agreeing to 
transfer a portion of its actual monopoly profits to other 
undertakings in exchange for market abstention.48
17. This notion, that there is cause for antitrust concern 
where undertakings artificially limit the potential for 
future competition, finds parallels in other areas of 
competition law. The ability to forestall and thus avoid 
potential competition is an implicit component of the 
concept of dominance for the purposes of Article  102 
TFEU, for instance. Per Hoffmann-La Roche, dominance 
reflects a position of economic strength pursuant to 
which the undertaking concerned can have “an appreci-
able influence on the conditions under which [any existing] 
competition will develop” on the relevant market.49 Of 
course, dominance as such is not prohibited; yet its mere 
existence triggers a special responsibility, reflecting, 
inter alia, the heightened ability of the dominant under-
taking to negatively affect current and future competition 
through exclusionary conduct.50 Furthermore, although 
classification of the dominant undertaking as an 
“unavoidable trading partner” is premised primarily upon 
barriers to expansion which prevent existing competi-
tors from increasing supply in the short term,51 the same 
market features are likely in many instances to function 
as a barrier to entry by potential competitors. 
18.  Moreover, many of the theories of harm that 
arise under Article  102 TFEU have as an undercur-
rent the notion of artificially diminishing or restricting 
the inherent uncertainty of the competition process. 
The concept of abuse thus targets, inter alia, “practices 
[that] tend to remove or restrict the buyer’s freedom as 
regards choice of sources of supply, [or] to bar competitors 
from access to the market.”52 These are, in effect, two sides 
of the same coin in terms of eliminating the uncertainty 
posed by the threat of potential competition: on the one 
hand, restricting the ability of consumers to switch to 
new competitors; on the other, restricting the ability of 
potential competitors to actually enter the marketplace.53 
19.  The antitrust treatment of so-called exclusivity 
rebates, whereby discounts are premised upon customers 
obtaining all or most of their requirements from the 
dominant undertaking, illustrates the role of market 
uncertainty here. Such rebates are, in effect, per se viola-
tions of Article  102 TFEU, on the basis that they are 
designed to remove or restrict the purchaser’s freedom to 
choose his sources of supply and, accordingly, to deny 
47 See J. R. Hicks, Annual Survey of  Economic Theory: The Theory of  Monopoly, 3 Econo-
metrica 1, 1935, 8.
48 Lundbeck, §§ 352 and 429.
49 Hoffmann-La Roche, § 39.
50 Case C-322/81 NV Nederlandsche Banden Industrie Michelin v. Commission 
EU:C:1983:313, § 10.
51 Hoffmann-La Roche, § 41.
52 C-280/08 P Deutsche Telekom AG v. European Commission EU:C:2010:603, § 175.
53 See, to this effect, Post Danmark (II), § 31.
other producers market access.54 Of importance for our 
purposes is that such exclusionary effect is generated 
through the grant of a financial advantage, which induces 
customers to refrain from obtaining supplies from alter-
native providers.55 In this manner, exclusivity rebates 
might similarly be viewed as a “buying-off” of compe-
tition, actual or potential, in a manner broadly equiva-
lent to the pay-to-delay agreements at issue in Lundbeck; 
the key difference in the rebates context being that the 
exclusion of competition arises indirectly, insofar as 
customers have been, in effect, paid to avoid “shopping 
around.” 
20. Similarly, supply contracts with dominant firms that 
are excessive in scope and duration may breach Article 102 
TFEU, where the effect is to make it more difficult for 
competing suppliers to acquire the dominant firm’s 
customers.56 Such practices may have a negative effect on 
both actual and potential competition—by hindering the 
ability of existing market players to expand their activ-
ities, but also making more difficult and thus deterring 
new entry, which limits levels of potential competition.57 
The anticompetitive motivation behind both exclusivity 
rebates and long-term contracts is thus essentially the 
same: by tying existing customers to the dominant under-
taking for an extended period, and restricting their ability 
to switch to alternative providers, such practices substan-
tially shrink the contestable portion of the market. 
The effect is to immunise the incumbent from actual and 
potential sources of competition, and thus attendant 
competitive constraints.
21. Finally, the case law on margin squeeze confirms that 
the exclusionary effects generated by such price-squeezing 
practices, and thus prohibited under Article 102 TFEU, 
extend to negative impacts on potential competitors.58 
In conducting the “as efficient competitor” analysis 
which lies at the heart of the legal test, the relevant costs 
are those incurred by the dominant undertaking,59 an 
approach which clearly facilitates a finding of abuse even 
where potential competition fails to materialise into new 
entry. Margin squeeze, unlike the treatment of rebates 
or exclusive supply arrangements, does not represent 
the direct “buying-off” of competition as such. Yet, as 
the court acknowledged obliquely in TeliaSonera, it 
might be viewed as a deliberate limitation of commer-
cial uncertainty in a manner not entirely dissimilar to 
that in Lundbeck. Specifically, given that the legal test for 
margin squeeze is premised upon a defendant’s own costs 
and business strategy, that undertaking is expected to be 
aware of the negative impact that its pricing practices 
54 Post Danmark (II), §  27; and Case T-286/09 Intel Corp. v. European Commission 
EU:T:2014:547, § 77.
55 Intel, § 77.
56 Commission Decision relating to a proceeding under Article  102 of  the Treaty on the 
Functioning of  the European Union and Article  54 of  the EEA Agreement (Case 
COMP/39.386 — Long-term contracts France), published 17 March 2010.
57 Ibid., §§ 34–35.
58 Case C-52/09 Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera Sverige AB EU:C:2011:83, § 39.
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would have in terms of its own business model, absent 
vertical integration.60 Consequently, it can be extrap-
olated from the setting of an unfair spread between 
wholesale and retail prices that the defendant should be 
aware of the anticompetitive potential of its actions. It 
might therefore be assumed that the defendant has delib-
erately acted to neutralise any competitive challenge 
downstream by maintaining such an unbalanced pricing 
structure, insofar as it is aware that profitable new entry 
is impossible.61 The effect, much as in the case of pay-to-
delay, is to curtail certain known sources of competitive 
constraint faced by the undertaking concerned, signifi-
cantly reducing the likelihood, and thus the risk, that 
potential entry downstream will materialise or succeed.
3. Potential competition versus 
the “as-efficient” competitor
22. A third consideration is the extent to which protec-
tion of potential competition aligns with a contem-
porary focus on efficiency-enhancing behaviour. As 
Advocate General Wahl has observed, emphatically, 
“given its economic character, competition law aims, in the 
final analysis, to enhance efficiency.”62 Within the context 
of Article 102 TFEU, this is manifested in adoption of 
an “as-efficient competitor” (AEC) standard by which 
to assess the exclusionary impact of alleged abuses; the 
Commission states that it “will normally only intervene 
where the conduct concerned has already been or is capable 
of hampering competition from competitors which are 
considered to be as efficient as the dominant undertak-
ing.”63 Limiting intervention to such circumstances aims 
to prioritise those situations in which the exclusionary 
effect of dominant behaviour has a concomitant negative 
impact on consumers, insofar as it is at least capable of 
excluding efficient (i.e., welfare-enhancing) sources of 
supply.64 There is recognition, nonetheless, that partic-
ipation by less efficient competitors may be benefi-
cial in certain circumstances—and thus merits antitrust 
protection—including where the market structure makes 
emergence of any as-efficient competitor practically 
impossible,65 or where a new entrant might benefit from 
network or learning effects which tend to enhance effi-
ciency over time.66
23. At its core, the AEC analysis represents an acknowl-
edgment that mere exclusion is not an exact synonym 
for consumer harm, and that it is the latter which forms 
the primary concern of competition law. All of which 
raises an important question regarding the nature of 
potential competition, and the extent to which it should 
60 TeliaSonera, §§ 42–45.
61 TeliaSonera, § 33.
62 Opinion in Intel, § 41.
63 Enforcement Priorities, § 23.
64 Opinion in Intel, § 42.
65 Post Danmark (II), § 59.
66 Enforcement Priorities, § 24.
be protected. The principal difficulty is that potential 
competition is inherently speculative. It represents 
incipient competitive forces which have not yet translated 
into actual commercial rivalry; accordingly, restricting 
potential competition does not deprive today’s consumers 
of alternative sources of supply, although it may restrict 
the options available to tomorrow’s consumers. Even 
that latter point remains somewhat notional, however; as 
discussed above, a finding of potential competition is not 
dependent upon any imminence of entry, or of any prob-
ability of success if  entry is indeed attempted. Restriction 
of potential competition as an antitrust theory of harm is 
thus more difficult to reconcile with the general principle 
that “the anti-competitive effect of a particular practice 
must not be purely hypothetical” to justify intervention.67 
To put the point another way, why does potential compe-
tition merit antitrust protection where we struggle to say 
with certainty that it contributes to overall consumer 
welfare?
24.  There are two ways of approaching this concep-
tual hurdle. The first would be to focus on the current 
contribution of potential rivals to competition within 
the relevant market. Implicit in the notion of potential 
competition as it emerges from Lundbeck is a percep-
tion on the part of incumbents that potential rivals 
pose at least a conceivable competitive threat, and that 
this external presence thus exerts competitive pressure 
on existing market players. Accordingly, even though 
the potential competitor may not contribute directly 
to increased efficiency, at the very least its presence 
constrains the market power of incumbent actors, and 
thus may serve to prevent “behaviour which constitutes an 
expression of market power to the detriment of competi-
tion and, thus, to consumers.”68 An alternative approach is 
to focus on the nature and quality of the potential rival’s 
future contribution to competition, if  and when entry is 
attempted. From this perspective, bearing in mind the 
truism that commercial rivalry is not an end in itself, but 
serves to produce efficiency and thus promote consumer 
welfare, artificial obstacles to potential competition are 
problematic only insofar as they deny the market an 
equally efficient source of supply, unless circumstances 
suggest that a less efficient competitor would nonetheless 
make a valuable contribution to overall welfare.
25.  Translating these distinct conceptual avenues to 
the approach in Lundbeck, we see the pay-to-delay 
settlements taking effect on the cusp between current 
and future understandings of potential competition. 
The rationale for these agreements, the case theory tells 
us, is that Lundbeck anticipated that the relevant coun-
terparties would—imminently—attempt entry. Prior to 
expiry of the API patent, generic undertakings could not 
be conceived of as immediate potential competitors: the 
outstanding IP right definitively rendered entry unlawful. 
To the extent that Lundbeck felt potential competitive 
67 Post Danmark (II), § 65. This approach can also be seen in the treatment of  Article 101 
TFEU in Case C-67/13 P Groupement des cartes bancaires (CB) v. European Commission 
EU:C:2014:2204, considered below.
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constraints before that point, these were primarily exerted 
by other originator firms, which might develop superior 
medicinal products that would disrupt demand for 
citalopram. In the lead-up to expiry of the API patent, 
however, generic undertakings soon-to-be able to enter 
and compete within the citalopram market began to exert 
competitive pressure. At that point, the supra-competi-
tive profits earned by Lundbeck served to invite entry, so 
that in order to maintain its existing market share going 
forward the incumbent operator either had to act in a 
more aggressively competitive manner—most obviously, 
by reducing prices—or, in order to minimise the threat 
posed by impending entry, in a more aggressively anti-
competitive manner—in that instance, by concluding the 
impugned settlements. 
26.  Locating this understanding of potential compe-
tition within the framework of Article  101(1) TFEU, 
the Commission concluded that the pay-to-delay agree-
ments had the object of restricting competition, making 
it unnecessary to consider whether they might have the 
effect of doing so in practice. This is, arguably, the most 
contentious element of the decision in Lundbeck. Desig-
nation as an object restriction effectively short-circuits 
the effects analysis that underpins the “more economic 
approach” to EU competition law.69 It is thus, in principle, 
limited to forms of coordination that “can be regarded, 
by their very nature, as being harmful to the proper func-
tioning of normal competition.”70 That is, the impugned 
agreement must “reveal a sufficient degree of harm to 
competition” as such, so that “there is no need to examine 
[its] effects.”71 The difficulty here is that, although the 
Commission articulates a plausible theory of harm by 
which pay-to-delay agreements might diminish consumer 
welfare by prolonging monopoly pricing,72 realising such 
harm in practice is contingent upon several antecedent 
assumptions: that entry would otherwise have been 
attempted, and would have succeeded in bringing down 
the market price. Yet, as we have seen, the definition of 
potential competition requires only “real concrete possi-
bilities” for entry, as opposed to, for instance, any likeli-
hood of success.73 Thus, it might be considered that there 
is a disjuncture between the orthodox understanding of 
the object category and its application in Lundbeck, which 
calls into question the conclusion that such arrangements 
should be considered harmful “by their very nature.” Such 
scepticism is reinforced by the approach of the Commis-
sion in the subsequent “pay-to-delay” case of Servier, 
in which it assessed broadly similar settlements as both 
object and effects-based restrictions of Article  101 
TFEU—and, moreover, as abusive dominant behaviour 
contrary to Article 102 TFEU.74
69 See, e.g., A.  Jones, Left Behind by Modernisation? Restrictions by Object under 
Article 101(1), 6 European Law Journal 649 (2010).
70 Cartes Bancaires, § 50.
71 Cartes Bancaires, § 49.
72 Lundbeck, § 386.
73 See note 4 above.
74 Commission Decision of  9 July 2014 in Case AT.39612 — Perindopril (Servier).
27. Yet, the finding of an object restriction in Lundbeck 
is nonetheless compatible with the orthodoxy under 
Article  101(1) TFEU, and in particular, the renewed 
emphasis on assessing a suspect agreement in light 
of the “content of its provisions, its objectives and the 
economic and legal context of which it forms a part” 
following the Cartes Bancaires judgment.75 In a sense, 
appraisal of the restraint in Lundbeck might be seen as 
the logical inverse of the conclusion in Cartes Bancaires 
itself.76 In the latter, a prima facie restriction was held to 
(arguably) fall outside the “object box,” given the signif-
icant efficiency justifications for the coordination when 
viewed in its specific economic context. Conversely, in 
Lundbeck, the legal and economic context served, in 
effect, to confirm the likelihood that these potentially 
restrictive arrangements would in fact harm competi-
tion. Relevant factors included the significant oppor-
tunities for market entry and thus upheaval created by 
expiry of the API patent,77 the comparative weakness of 
Lundbeck’s process patent,78 and the likely impact of any 
attempted new entry on regulated drug prices at national 
level.79 Moreover, although the subjective intention of the 
contracting parties is not determinative,80 the fact that 
Lundbeck sought deliberately to ensure that potential 
competition would not translate into actual competi-
tion served to reinforce the conclusion that these agree-
ments were inherently harmful to competition, even if  
the precise harm anticipated remained somewhat contin-
gent or remote. The Commission could thus validly 
conclude that the impugned settlements were comparable 
to market exclusion agreements.81 The specific market 
dynamics at issue accordingly rendered such deliberate 
efforts to subvert the competition process fundamentally 
suspect from an antitrust perspective, even in the absence 
of any direct link between the claimed potential competi-
tion and consumer welfare.
IV. Conclusion
28. Patent protection is wide-ranging yet temporary; the 
ostensible dichotomy it creates between monopoly and 
competition is sharp. Yet in its hinterland lies the spectre 
of potential competition, premised upon and activated 
by the market opportunities that result from inevitable 
expiry of the relevant IP right. As this contribution has 
discussed, the protection of potential competition has 
a particular pertinence in the context of pharmaceu-
tical “pay-to-delay” settlements, where the supposed 
borderline between patent-protected monopoly and 
75 Cartes Bancaires, § 53.
76 Contrast Gallasch (2016), 691, arguing that, post-Cartes Bancaires, the task of  defending 





80 BIDS, § 21. 
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open competition in fact accommodates a multiplicity of 
activities intended to realise—or, conversely, subvert—
such competition in the future. Returning to the imagery 
which opened our discussion, patent holders inescapably 
hold a “losing hand” to the extent that any monopoly 
granted is time-limited yet the attendant publicity require-
ments are irreversible. Slow play via “pay-to-delay” may 
stave off  the inevitable momentarily, yet it does so at the 
expense of consumer welfare and public budgets and, 
it might be argued, by upsetting the balance already 
struck within the patent system. Although at first glance 
perhaps somewhat conceptually problematic, therefore, 
the antitrust treatment of potential competition within 
the recent Lundbeck case in fact reflects a nuanced under-
standing of the interplay of competitive forces—actual 
and potential—within the market concerned. 
29.  Yet Lundbeck, and its consideration of potential 
competition, has resonance beyond the narrow context 
of its market circumstances. This contribution has sought 
to illustrate and analyse the extent to which the concept 
has a grounding within the framework of EU competi-
tion law, and moreover, the manner in which its protec-
tion might be reconciled with our current preoccupation 
with “more economic” approaches to antitrust analysis. 
Protection of potential competition must negotiate a 
difficult path: between healthy scepticism of unduly 
speculative theories of harm which might prompt false 
positives, on the one hand, and the dynamic nature of the 
competition process on the other, premised upon contest-
able markets and creative destruction. Lundbeck provides 
a convincing, though not unassailable, defence of the 
latter, confirming the central importance of potential 
competition, particularly in markets where actual compe-
tition is substantially curtailed. The wider application of 
this comparatively expansive understanding of potential 
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The notion of “potential 





PhD Candidate, Leiden University, 
Chairperson, Hong Kong Competition Association
I. Introduction
1. This article explores the state of the law on pay-for-
delay agreements in the US. It also presents an oppor-
tunity, in the context of the present series of articles, to 
compare the approach in the US with the EU case law 
with regards to the notion of potential competitor, which 
has crystallised a large swath of the Lundbeck debate in 
the EU.1 This approach, outlined below in three sections, 
reveals fundamental differences between US cases, in 
which very little attention was given to whether parties 
were competing or not, and the European Commis-
sion/GC debate, which focussed heavily on this issue. 
This article argues that the notion of potential compet-
itor has been given excessive amounts of attention by EU 
enforcers and courts, due to reliance on precedents which 
were not related to pay-for-delay agreements. It purports 
to highlight the advantages of the US approach to 
assessing reverse patent settlements. 
2. The debate over the notion of potential competitor did 
not happen in a vacuum. It developed at a very particular 
time for antitrust enforcement, when a growing focus on 
new technologies, IP issues and innovation forces regu-
lators to think increasingly in terms of what the market 
could look like in a couple of years. The question of 
whether competition authorities and courts should look 
at future markets, and to what extent, is of course at the 
heart of today’s multiple debates concerning the interac-
tion of antitrust and innovation. As the present article 
discusses below, the notion of potential competitor took 
off  in US antitrust in the U.S. v. Microsoft judgment, 
further highlighting that competitive dynamics are more 
complex in innovation-linked markets. This fundamental 
1 See the EC ruling: European Commission, Lundbeck, Case  AT.39226, 19  June 2013; 
and the General Court decision: General Court (Ninth Chamber), H. Lundbeck A/S and 
Lundbeck Ltd v. European Commission, Case T-472/13, 8 September 2016. 
link between innovation and the notion of potential 
competitor means that the issue is likely to resurface, 
given the importance of IP issue and innovation-related 
questions in today’s antitrust landscape. 
3. This article begins with a first section on the state of 
the law on pay-for-delay agreements in the US, including 
the legislative and regulatory framework surrounding 
the approval of generic drugs. The second part discusses 
how the notion of potential competitor was approached 
in a merger context, where it is more developed than in 
antitrust enforcement. The third part looks at Sherman 
Act enforcement, including in pay-for-delay cases and in 
the U.S. v. Microsoft judgment. The fourth part argues 
that the reason why the notion of potential competitor 
is not a central factor in pay-for-delay enforcement is 
that US courts and enforcers have found pragmatic and 
reasonable approaches to the issue, resulting in height-
ened legal certainty in the pharmaceutical industry. 





4. In the history of pay-for-delay enforcement, there is a 
before and after Actavis. In the Federal Trade Commis-
sion v. Actavis Inc.2 case, the Supreme Court of the 
United States confirmed that the FTC could investigate 
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“reverse payment” or “reverse settlement” agreements. 
The Supreme Court reversed the District Court and the 
Circuit Court, and said that the fact that these agree-
ments were framed as dispute settlement agreements, 
or intellectual property agreements, did not prevent the 
enforcement of antitrust laws against them. It stopped 
short of qualifying reverse patent settlements per se anti-
competitive, and instead directed the courts to use a rule-
of-reason approach. 
5.  Before looking at the impact of Actavis on US 
antitrust enforcement, it is necessary to understand the 
normative background in which the decision took place. 
Prior to 1984, the only way for manufacturers of generic 
drugs (hereinafter “generic manufacturers”) to put new 
drugs on the market was to introduce them the same 
way drug originators did: by filing a new drug applica-
tion. Generic manufacturer applicants were required to 
submit safety and efficacy tests as part of their applica-
tion, regardless of whether such tests had already been 
performed for similar components for the original drug, 
prior to its approval. This triggered two types of issues: 
first, a new drug application is an expensive and cumber-
some process, and undergoing studies which have already 
been completed was inefficient. Second, performing such 
studies could have infringed the patent of the drug orig-
inator and therefore exposed the generic manufacturer 
to patent litigation. Congress, in a move to spur more 
generic applications, passed the Drug Price Competition 
and Patent Term Restoration Act, or “Hatch-Waxman” 
Act (“the Act”), in 1984. The principal measure of the 
Act is to create a second track for drug approval, specif-
ically aimed at generic manufacturers: the abbreviated 
new drug application (ANDA). An ANDA allows an 
applicant to rely on the safety and efficacy studies previ-
ously filed by the drug originator.3 To further facilitate 
the introduction of generics, the Act clarifies that such 
use of the drug originator’s studies does not constitute a 
patent infringement. 
6.  The Act makes information accessible for generic 
manufacturers to facilitate entry: drug originators are 
required, when applying for a new drug approval, to 
submit to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
the patent numbers and expiration dates of any patents 
which a generic manufacturer may infringe. This infor-
mation is publicised by the FDA, in what is colloquially 
known as the Orange Book. Generic manufacturers who 
file for an ANDA must make one of the four following 
certifications: first, that the patent information was not 
filed by the drug originator was not filed by the FDA; 
second, that the patent is expired; third, that the patent 
will expire soon; or fourth that the patent is invalid, or 
that the method chosen by the generic manufacturer 
to manufacture, use, or sell the drug will not infringe 
the patent. The first and the second options merit little 
comment, as these essentially mean that there will be 
no conflict between the two actors. In the third option, 
the FDA cannot grant approval of the generic before 
the expiry of the patent. The fourth option, commonly 
3 21 U.S.C. 355(j). 
known as a “paragraph IV certification,” is the course of 
events in which antitrust lawyers will be most interested. 
Under the Act, the applicant must notify the patent 
holder. The notification opens a 45-day window for the 
patent holder to file suit for infringement. If  such a suit 
is filed, the ANDA approval is automatically delayed by 
thirty months. This delay terminates if  the court hearing 
the infringement suit declares the patent invalid or not 
infringed. If the court rules in favour of the patent holder, 
the ANDA approval is set for a date after the expiry of the 
patent. If  competing generic manufacturers file multiple 
ANDA applications for a single drug, the Act provides a 
strong incentive for generic manufacturers to try and be 
“first in line,” as the successful first applicant is granted a 
180-day exclusivity period following the approval of the 
generic drug. 
7.  Reverse patent settlement agreements, or “pay-for-
delay” agreements, take place in this regulatory and legis-
lative context. The drug originator, having been warned 
by the generic manufacturer itself  (remember that a noti-
fication is mandatory under the Act), enters into negoti-
ations with the generic manufacturer, for instance during 
the patent infringement suit which ensues the ANDA 
application. When the drug originator pays or otherwise 
compensates the generic manufacturer to stay out of the 
market for this particular drug, this settlement agreement 
may infringe Section  1 of the Sherman Act. Since the 
2013 Actavis case, which confirmed that antitrust enforce-
ment was possible against these agreements no matter 
how these were framed, the debate has shifted. In two 
recent significant decisions, two circuit courts of appeal 
confirmed that the absence of a cash payment did not 
bar antitrust enforcement against a reverse patent settle-
ment.4 One of these two decisions, by the Third Circuit, 
is currently pending appeal to the Supreme Court, which 
has not yet announced whether it will grant certiorari. 
The reason for the relative uncertainty around non-cash 
settlements is the language of the Actavis ruling, which 
refers to “large unexplained payments.” It may have been 
a no-brainer that non-cash settlements may too violate 
antitrust laws. Yet the Actavis ruling, as many others in 
recent years, saw a court divided along partisan lines (5-3, 
with Roberts, Scalia and Thomas dissenting, and Alito 
recusing himself). Therefore, the uncertainty remains. 
8. The Act has at least partially achieved its goals in that 
it greatly increased the share of generics prescribed in 
the US. However, it is also criticised, by academics and 
by the courts, for having created incentives to collude. 
Justice Breyer, writing for the Supreme Court in Actavis, 
noted that it was unusual for patentees to settle with 
challengers, since this could attract a flurry of other 
litigants. It may be, as Justice Breyer noted, that the 
180-day delay included in the Act for any successful 
generic manufacturer who was not the first applicant 
may explain why in generic drug application-related 
litigation, the fear of attracting more litigants did not 
seem to play such a restraint on the patentee’s incentive 
4 See Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litigation, No. 14-2071 and 15-1250 (1st Cir.) and King Drug 
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to settle. An additional possible criticism of the Act is 
that the relatively open and transparent mechanism of 
the Orange Book clearly signals to drug originators 
where the competition is coming from. The applicant 
who files a paragraph IV certification certainly loses 
the benefits of any surprise effect, but it also puts the 
two actors on track for a collusion in court, which is all 
too tempting to resolve by a settlement. There does not 
seem to have been any study focussed on the costs and 
benefits of the relative transparency of the Orange Book 
mechanism, versus a system in which generic manufac-
turers do not have to reveal their plans until, for instance, 
shortly before the drug is put on the market. It seems, at 
least intuitively, that this would shorten the time period 
available for drug originators and generic manufacturers 
to engage in reverse patent settlements—although this 
may run against public policy, which favours the settle-
ment of disputes. 
III. Potential 
competitor in a 
merger context
9. The surprising element of the US regulatory and case 
law background to pay-for-delay settlements is, for the 
EU lawyer, its relative simplicity. One may believe that 
in a system in which antitrust law enforcement is often 
criminal, and where the courts welcome direct action 
by plaintiffs, the law would become daedalian, but the 
mere 20 pages of Justice Breyer’s opinion in Actavis strike 
by their brevity. This contrasts with the 847 paragraphs 
of the General Court of the EU’s ruling in Lundbeck, 
upholding the 464-page Commission decision, of which 
nearly 170 are dedicated to the issue of “potential 
competitor.” This article is not the place to discuss the 
merits of simplicity in judicial decisions, but there is 
value in trying to determine whether such focus, in the 
EU approach, is beneficial to the parties, to the pharma-
ceutical industry and even to the antitrust community, 
who must now adjust their practices and advice based on 
the Lundbeck principles. In short, one must ask whether 
such a debate advances the law at all, and the comparison 
with the US approach might help to answer this question. 
1. The potential competitor 
doctrine as an enforcement sword
10. In contrast, the US potential competitor doctrine has 
evolved in three phases, resulting in a settled approach 
which is no longer the subject of the debates it once 
was, and certainly not the debates seen in the EU in the 
Lundbeck context. The framework is somehow different, 
however, since the potential competitor doctrine 
primarily developed in a merger control context, and it 
remains a predominantly merger-related concept today. 
In a merger context, potential competitors are a neigh-
bouring notion to the idea of “market entry,” which in 
turn raises issues of barrier to entry. However, the devel-
opment of the potential competitor doctrine in the US 
took place at a very particular time: in the 1960s and 
1970s. Anti-merger sentiment was rife among regulators 
at that time, and the fear of what was perceived as ever-
growing conglomerates led to numerous enforcement 
actions against planned mergers. Because of the context 
in which the doctrine developed, its relevance to today’s 
competition enforcement is limited, and the test as it 
evolved has not been applied outside of merger control. 
11.  The potential competitor doctrine has been one of 
the very creative theories of harm developed by enforcers 
and by the courts in the 1960s, when the fear of conglom-
erates led to an aggressive period of merger enforcement, 
resulting in multiple combinations which were blocked 
or which settled with remedies—cases which would 
probably not have met the same fate today. In particular, 
two Supreme Court decisions crystallised the concept, 
with strong anti-merger sentiments in the background 
and serious consequences ensuing. In United States 
v. Penn-Olin Chemicals Co.,5 the Supreme Court in 1964 
reversed the District Court decision which had allowed 
two companies to form a joint venture. It held that “[t]
he test of whether a joint venture might substantially lessen 
competition within the meaning of [Section]  7 [of  the 
Clayton Act] is not only whether both parent companies 
would probably have entered the market, or whether one 
would probably have entered alone, but also whether the 
joint venture eliminated the potential competition of the 
company that might have stayed at the edge of the market, 
threatening to enter.”6 
12. The parties had entered into a joint venture to enter 
into a new market, and the DOJ was seeking to block the 
concentration despite the absence of evidence that either 
of the parties was planning to individually enter this new 
market. The court ruled that Section  7 of the Clayton 
Act was concerned with “probabilities, no certainties.”7 
This added the concept of the elimination of a threat-
ening competitor; to the already long list of theories of 
harm pursued by the DOJ in its crusade against mergers 
and perceived conglomerates. This potential competi-
tion theory was then applied in the 1967 infamous FTC 
v. Procter & Gamble Co.,8 in which the court empowered 
the FTC to block P&G’s acquisition of a household 
bleach maker. The Supreme Court, reflecting the language 
of its earlier decision in Penn-Olin, agreed with the FTC 
that P&G was “at the edge of the industry.”9 There was 
scant evidence that P&G would have entered the market 
absent an acquisition, but it remained, for the agency, the 
“most likely entrant.”10 
5 United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co. 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
6 Ibid., at 173–174. 
7 Ibid., at 182. 
8 FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co. 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
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13. The theory focussed on “perceived” potential compe-
tition was then a tool to block mergers and concentra-
tions, but it soon bent under the weight of the Chicago 
School of economics. Prior to the spread of Chicago 
School ideas, the theory was that a perceived potential 
entrant would already influence the market, and incum-
bents will charge below monopoly prices in order to deter 
entry. The next two decades saw the “perceived” potential 
competition theory, and in particular the idea of a disci-
plinary effect of potential entrants on prices, retreat under 
court decisions imposing higher standards of proof on 
agencies and requiring evidence of “actual” plans to 
enter the market. This shift built on the fact that there 
was limited empirical evidence to support the idea that 
the pressure exercised by a potential entrant was compa-
rable to the pricing limit effect of actual competition.11 
The  FTC lost a string of cases and was subsequently 
required to provide proof of active steps towards entry 
or, absent such evidence, some other objective evidence 
that entry was likely.12 The actual potential entry; thus 
gradually took shape, slowly raising the bar of the reason-
able probability of entry; standard of the 1960s.13 
2. The potential competitor 
doctrine as a shield against 
enforcement
14.  The economic rationale behind perceived potential 
competition is that the market behaviour of actors is 
influenced not only by current market players, but also by 
potential market players. Consequently, this can play both 
ways in antitrust disputes. Turning the argument around, 
companies seeking to merge can invoke potential entrants 
as a defence: this is the “ease of entry” defence. Because 
the economic theory purports that a monopoly may not 
charge monopoly prices if  entry is so easy that monopoly 
prices would attract new entrants—merging parties 
accused or suspected of seeking monopoly power turned 
the argument around to claim that potential entrants 
would limit their market power. In the 1980s, despite the 
controversies surrounding the theoretical basis for this 
defence, the Department of Justice (DOJ) lost a series 
of merger challenges in court, based on low barriers to 
entry.14 In each case, the arguments developed by agencies 
to support potential competition as a theory of harm 
were used by the merging firms to justify transactions 
that would lead to high levels of concentrations. The DOJ 
attempted to rebut the evidence, alleging that there was 
no proof that entry would take place in the short term, or 
that it would put pressure on the incumbents. The court 
replied, flipping the argument around, that Section 7 was 
concerned with “probabilities, no certainties.”
11 L.  A.  Sullivan, W.  S.  Grimes and C.  L.  Sagers, The Law of  Antitrust (West Academic 
Publishing, 2016), 561. 
12 See, for instance, Tenneco, Inc., Petitioner, v. FTC, 689 F.2d 346 (2d Cir. 1982).
13 For a rare Supreme Court decision discussing the “perceived potential competitor” theory, 
and rejecting an FTC complaint on the basis that the agency had not met its burden of  
proof, see: United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc. 418 U.S. 602 (1974).
14 United States v. Waste Management, Inc. 743 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984). See also United States 





15.  The notion of potential competitor in US laws 
is almost absent from US antitrust enforcement. 
The Sherman Act does not mention “potential compet-
itors.” In the FTC and DOJ’s Antitrust Guidelines 
for Collaboration Among Competitors, the notion is 
expedited as early as page 2, in a footnote which reads: 
“Firms also may be in a buyer-seller or other relation-
ship, but that does not eliminate the need to examine the 
competitor relationship, if present. A firm is treated as a 
potential competitor if there is evidence that entry by that 
firm is reasonably probable in the absence of the relevant 
agreement, or that competitively significant decisions by 
actual competitors are constrained by concerns that anti-
competitive conduct likely would induce the firm to enter.”
16.  The most high-profile and most detailed discus-
sion of potential competition in an antitrust context is 
found in the U.S. v. Microsoft judgment.15 The argument 
appears when Microsoft contends that the government 
did not sufficiently prove causation (i.e., that its anticom-
petitive conduct was not caused by its monopoly power). 
The court counters by inferring causation when Micro-
soft’s conduct appears reasonably capable of making 
a contribution to its monopoly power. Since the court 
found that the actions of Microsoft were directed as 
“nascent competitors,” it feels compelled to explain that 
even against newly established competitors, exclusionary 
conduct against these nascent competitors can be suffi-
cient to infer causation. This passage of the Microsoft 
decision therefore deals with a different type of potential 
competitor than those discussed above under merger 
control rules, and those referred to at such length in 
the decisions of the Commission and the GC, in which 
competitors have not yet entered the market. Nonethe-
less, the Microsoft passage highlights the limitations of 
courts and agencies in dealing with events which have not 
yet happened. 
17.  These passages crystallise the very deficiencies of 
antitrust rules (and legal rules in general) in dealing with 
fast-moving markets and innovative products, which are 
characterised by a high degree of uncertainty. Yet, the 
passage also demonstrates the court’s ingenuity in assem-
bling antithetic concepts such as “causation” and “uncer-
tainty.” The DC Circuit court begins by dismissing the 
idea that it must adhere to the traditional “causation” 
test, which is, in the traditional verbose style of the 
DC Circuit, “edentulous.” Rather, the court finds two 
questions to answer. First, whether in general the elim-
ination of nascent threats is “reasonably capable of 
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contributing significantly to a defendant’s continued 
monopoly power.”16 The court finds that the Sherman 
Act’s purpose is well served by ensuring that monopo-
lists do not have free reign in quashing “nascent, albeit 
unproven, competitors at will—particularly in indus-
tries marked by rapid technological advance and frequent 
paradigm shifts.”17 Second, the court must determine 
whether the parties excluded in this case “reasonably 
constituted nascent threats.”18 This point was conceded 
by Microsoft itself  during oral arguments, and therefore 
Microsoft was found to be increasing its monopoly power 
when it excluded Java and Netscape, two nascent devel-
opers of software applications. This is controversial: the 
same Navigator and Java had been, in the same decision, 
eliminated from the market definition (thus allowing 
for the government to successfully frame Microsoft as a 
monopoly) on the basis that the effect of Navigator and 
Java’s entry on the market was not reasonably foreseeable, 
and would only take place in “several years.” The court 
found no contradiction in this, and confirmed that there 
was truly under the law a double standard regarding 
potential entrant as a threat, and potential entrant as a 
competitive pressure acting as a check on a monopolist. 
The difference, the court argued, lies in the language of 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which allows for enforce-
ment against exclusionary behaviour targeted at nascent 
threats (or rather did not prohibit it), and the exercise 
of market definition which is focussed on identifying 
products which are readily (i.e., currently) substitutable. 
18.  Looking past this questionable double standard, 
the interesting focus here is on the perception by the 
defendant itself  of who its potential competitors are. 
Through discovery, depositions and cross-examination, 
if  company B truly poses a threat to company A, a well-
mounted litigation strategy should be able to uncover a 
document, an email, or a power point which records this 
fear, or it should be able to find someone to testify of the 
company’s perception. This emphasis on the company’s 
perception at least as a matter of proof, and its simplicity, 
rely on well-established processes of discovery and on 
the ability to cross-examine witnesses under oath and in 
an open court. The benefits of such features of a legal 
system are innumerable. Looking at the question of the 
level of proof in relation to potential competition, such 
a trust in the strength of the litigation tools is also found 
in the FTC practice, which said in 1980 about finding 
subjective evidence of intention to enter a market: “It will 
often be difficult to secure such evidence. Nevertheless, if 
the firm’s intention to enter independently has become 
sufficiently concrete to warrant the preparation of capital 
budgets and other actual steps toward entry, that intention 
will ordinarily be memorialized in one documentary form 
or another.”19
16 Ibid., p. 79. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 FTC, Opinion of  the Commission in the matter of  B.A.T. Industries, Ltd., and Appleton 
Papers, Inc., 104 FTC, 852 (1984), p. 916. 
V. Conclusion: 
Why the notion of 
potential competitor 
is not a factor in pay-
for-delay litigation
19.  As said above and in the Actavis case, one of the 
flaws of the Act is its tendency to allow drug origina-
tors and generic manufacturers to easily find each other, 
possibly resulting in reverse patent settlements. However, 
for the enforcers and the courts, this has turned into an 
advantage: the ANDA approval process, which requires 
the generic manufacturer to file with the FDA and to 
notify the patent holder at the same time, clearly identi-
fies the potential competitors. 
20. This was not the intention of Congress, just as it was 
not the intention of Congress to increase pharmaceutical 
companies’ incentives to collude, but it results from this 
regulatory set-up that there is little doubt left about who 
is a threat to whom. Generic manufacturers are required 
by law to write to the patent holder and essentially tell 
them: “I intend to put a similar drug on the market.” 
There is no space in the US framework for the argument 
raised by the parties in the EU Lundbeck case, i.e., that 
they were not competitors at the time of the agreement 
and that therefore the agreement is not anticompetitive. 
21. However, this is not to say that US courts in pay-for-
delay litigation are not concerned with who does what, 
and where companies sit vis-à-vis each other. Actavis and 
Paddock, the respondents, were potential competitors 
to Solvay, since they filed applications saying essentially 
this. The pragmatism of the court is to be lauded: it is not 
a possible option for the parties to challenge this reality. 
The reason is not that the regulatory framework was 
fundamentally different than in the EU Lundbeck case. 
It was not. The argument was not raised because it would 
have made no sense. Justice Breyer ruled that a large, 
unexplained payment is sufficient to show that there are 
doubts about the survival of the patent. The  corollary 
to this is that a large unexplained payment is suffi-
cient to prove that Solvay believed that the respond-
ents were a credible threat to Solvay’s revenue line. In 
other pay-for-delay cases, including cases pre-Actavis, 
the issue of potential competition is generally accorded 
one paragraph. For instance, in Drug Valley Company, 
a case about hypertension drugs, the 11th Circuit Court 
of Appeals noted that “on the eve of the agreement, both 
Geneva and Zenith were poised to market generic versions 
of Hytrin in the United States.”20
20 Valley Drug Company, Louisiana Wholesale Drug Company, Inc., et al., v. Geneva Pharma-
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22.  To have entertained, as the General Court did in 
Lundbeck, the parties’ argument that competition law did 
not apply to them because they were not, at the time of 
the agreement, potential competitors, is doing everyone a 
disservice. The parties presumably have spent staggering 
amounts of time and money mounting this argument, 
with little chances of success. The General Court spent 
resources writing a mind-numbing 330 paragraphs to 
confirm that yes, drug originators and generic manufac-
turers who entered into a multi-million-dollar agreement 
are indeed potential competitors. This has now been 
appealed, including on the ground that the court erred 
on finding that the parties were potential competitors.21 
The Commission’s decision to entertain the argument, 
and the General Court’s willingness to debate it seem to 
be founded on vaguely related precedents.22 By no stretch 
of the imagination could these precedents have called for 
a tedious justification of the obvious. 
21 See, for instance, for one of  the six notices of  appeal: Case C-591/16 P: Appeal brought 
on 18 November 2016 by H. Lundbeck A/S, Lundbeck Ltd against the judgment of  the 
General Court (Ninth Chamber) delivered on 8 September 2016 in Case  T-472/13 H. 
Lundbeck A/S, Lundbeck Ltd v. European Commission.
22 Joined-Cases T-374/94, T-375/94, T-384/94 and T-388/94, European Night Services and 
Others v. Commission [1998] ECR II-3141; and Case T-461/07 Visa Europe Ltd and Visa 
International Service v. European Commission, 14 April 2011. 
23.  In conclusion, the comparison of the US and the 
EU approach on potential competition reveals that 
the US has developed a solid and simple presumption: 
that  a large, unexplained payment is sufficient to show 
that there are doubts about the survival of the patent. 
This  presumption could be applied to the notion of 
potential competitor in the EU, thus resulting in improved 
legal security and certainty. This would free resources on 
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The Lundbeck case through 
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I. Introduction: Pay-
for-delay agreements 
and the balance 
between patent law 
and competition law
1. Pay-for-delay agreements, or patent settlement agree-
ments with reverse payment, are agreements concluded 
between the holder of the patent (originator firm) and 
the generic supplier in the pharmaceutical industry. They 
are entered into before the date of the expiry of the patent 
to avoid litigation concerning the validity of the patent 
and may involve ‘agreed entry dates’ and the ‘transfer 
of value’ to the generic firm. In addition, they may also 
cover the delay of the entry of the generic version of the 
patented drug into the market after the expiry of the 
patent in which case they clearly infringe antitrust rules. 
Although patent settlement agreements can save cost 
and time, and promote innovation, they might also raise 
antitrust concerns. For instance, the prices of the drugs 
may increase, since the monopoly of the former patent 
holder is preserved. Consumers may be harmed and 
innovation hindered.1 Scrutinising the effects of patent 
settlements with reverse payments is clearly relevant from 
a consumer welfare perspective, so that the effects of 
the conduct in prices and innovation may be monitored 
by antitrust authorities. Moreover, such arrangements 
also have significant implications for the application of 
patent law. In particular, issues might arise in the context 
of so-called “weak patents”—that is, those patents that 
might not be indisputably invalid, “but nobody knows for 
1 For an analysis of  the contrasting approaches taken in the EU and in the USA with regard 
to reverse patent settlement agreements, see D. Geradin, D. Ginsburg and G. Safty, Reverse 
Payment Patent Settlements in the European Union and the United States, George Mason 
University Legal Studies Research Paper Series LS 15–22, 2015. See also W. Choi, B. den 
Uyl and M. Hughes, Pay-for-Delay Practices in the Pharmaceutical Sector: Lundbeck, 
Actavis, and Others, 5(1) Journal of  European Competition Law & Practice, 2014, 44.
sure without conclusive litigation.”2 In fact, it has been 
pointed out that patent settlements with large reverse 
payments will only occur where weak patents exist.3 Both 
the consumer welfare and patent law dimensions should, 
therefore, be considered closely linked in the analysis of 
this type of agreements. 
2.  The study of patent settlements in the pharmaceu-
tical industry cannot ignore the evidence that suggests 
that patents are sometimes granted erroneously. While 
only a small number of patents—about 0.1%—is chal-
lenged in court, of those that are challenged around 50% 
are deemed to be invalid in patent litigation.4 Such statis-
tics encourage the patent holder to settle if  its patent is 
indeed facing legal action.5 These patent settlements may 
have the positive effect of avoiding litigation costs, but 
they may also create barriers to market entry and hinder 
competition. 
3.  The majority of scholars argue that pay-for-delay 
agreements must be assessed under competition law. 
However, there is no consensus as to the most adequate 
legal solution. Some advocate for a presumption of ille-
gality for pay-for-delay agreements,6 while others argue 
that they should be per se illegal.7 Some voices defend 
analysing them under the rule of reason,8 and there are 
2 J. Farrell and C. Shapiro, How Strong are Weak Patents? 98 American Economic Review 4, 
2008, 1347–1369, at p. 1347.
3 See W. Kerber and S. Frank, Patent Settlements in the Pharmaceutical Industry: What 
Can We Learn from Economic Analysis? Philipps-Universität  Marburg, MACIE Paper 
Series, No. 2016/1, p. 2.
4 Furthermore, it has been argued that proving validity and infringement is more difficult 
for process claims, see, for example, O. Zafar, Lundbeck, and Johnson & Johnson and 
Novartis: The European Commission’s 2013 “Pay-for-Delay” Decisions, 5(4), Journal of  
European Competition Law & Practice, 2014, p. 207.
5 As Kerber and Frank pointed out, “from an economic perspective, policy solutions for the 
weak patent problem in competition law and in patent law are alternative options.” Kerber and 
Frank (2016) above, p. 26
6 See H. Hovenkamp et al., IP and Antitrust, 2d ed. (Wolters Kluwer, 2010) § 15.3a1(C).
7 M. A. O’Rourke and J. F. Brodley, An Incentives Approach to Patent Settlements, 87 
Minnesota Law Review, 2003, p. 1767.
8 R. D. Blair and T. F. Cotter, Are Settlements of  Patent Disputes Illegal per Se? 47 Antitrust 
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also those scholars who propose the application of a 
structured effects-based approach instead of considering 
those agreements restrictions by object.9 The difficul-
ties in striking the right balance between the interests of 
patent law—in increasing the incentives given to pharma-
ceutical firms to innovate—and the interests of compe-
tition law—in avoiding consumer harm—are, therefore, 
particularly visible in this kind of agreements. 
4. The goal of this article is to analyse the Lundbeck case 
through the lens of probabilistic patent rights theory. 
As stressed above, the actual scope of a patent right, 
its commercial value and its validity are contingent 
questions. These uncertainties are an inherent part of the 
patent system and require rethinking not only several of 
the solutions offered by patent law, but also the limits of 
competition law when it comes to patent settlements. The 
purpose here is to reflect on the new approach followed 
by the GC in the Lundbeck case, taking into account 
the theory of probabilistic patent rights. The article first 
explores the essentials of probabilistic patents theory 
(II.). It then goes on to discuss the Lundbeck case (III.), 
and the concept of potential competitor that the GC 
seems to adhere to  (IV.). Subsequently, the judgment is 
placed in the context of previous developments in the EU 
and US relating to the concept of potential competitors 
(V.), and conclusions are drawn (VI.).
II. The theory of 
probabilistic patents 
explained
5. The uncertainties as to the commercial significance of 
patents and as to their validity have been clearly stressed 
by Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro in the theory of prob-
abilistic patent rights. They challenge the traditional view 
that sees patents as well-defined property rights giving 
their owners a monopoly over a market and competitive 
advantages. According to the conventional position, once 
issued patents should be presumed valid, and the owner 
could, therefore, exclude rivals. Moreover, patents would 
be issued without engaging in extensive evaluation, which 
would increase the likelihood of invalidity and put into 
question the commercial value of the patents. Taking into 
account these uncertainties, the authors concluded that a 
“patent does not confer upon its owner the right to exclude 
but rather a right to try to exclude.”10 The  patent legal 
framework would thus encourage firms to settle either 
using reverse payments or other solutions. Among the 
latter would be licensing agreements with small royalties, 
for instance. Since some of these agreements should be 
9 S. Gallasch, Activating Actavis in Europe – the Proposal of  a “Structured Effects-Based” 
Analysis for Pay-for-Delay Settlements, University of  East Anglia Centre for Competition 
Policy Working Paper 15-3, 2016.
10 M. A. Lemley and C. Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19(2), Journal of  Economic Perspec-
tives, 2005, pp. 80, 94–95. See also D. Encaoua and Y. Lefouili, Licensing Weak Patents, 
57 Journal of  Industrial Economics, 2009, pp. 492–525. 
presumed anticompetitive, particularly patent settle-
ments with large reverse payments, probabilistic patent 
rights theory suggests that antitrust limits on these settle-
ments are needed.
6.  According to the probabilistic patents theory, the 
owner of a patent only has a probabilistic right, and is 
not entitled to conclude an agreement that would harm 
consumers. It is not easy, however, to identify the agree-
ments that might have such effects. The legal standard 
proposed by Shapiro compares the welfare for consumers 
in the case of patent settlements with the one that would 
be achieved with patent litigation. As he puts it, “a settle-
ment must leave consumers as well off as they would 
have been from ongoing patent litigation.”11 If  consumer 
welfare is lower in the case of patent settlements than 
in the case of patent litigation, the agreement should 
be considered anticompetitive, and prohibited. In this 
context, the existence of large reverse payments in excess 
of the expected costs of litigation leads to the presump-
tion that the patent is weak and that the settlement 
should be considered anticompetitive.12
7. In addition, if  we accept Shapiro’s normative standard, 
the concept of potential competitor under article  101 
TFEU should also be redefined. Traditionally, patents 
were presumed valid until considered void by the 
competent authorities; generic producers could not, 
therefore, be considered potential competitors, as patents 
were well-defined rights and the entry of competitors 
could only occur in violation of the patents. Through the 
lens of the probabilistic patent rights theory, potential 
competitor must be redefined and should also be consid-
ered probabilistic: “(…) a generic entrant would still be 
seen as a potential competitor if there is a sufficiently high 
probability that it would actually prevail in litigation and 
therefore be able to enter the market.”13 
8. The probabilistic patent rights theory was also consid-
ered by the Supreme Court in the USA. The US pharma-
ceutical sector is regulated by the Hatch-Waxman Act.14 
The purpose of this Act is encouraging generic manu-
facturers to challenge invalid patents from the origi-
nator firm by offering a 180-day market exclusivity for 
the first producer challenging the patent to enter the 
market and to offer generic drugs at a cheaper price. 
Although in the EU there is no equivalent to the Hatch-
Waxman Act, pay-for-delay agreements have also been 
used frequently in Europe to buy the originator company 
time to establish a new version of its drug. Such use of 
pay-for-delay contracts clearly raises antitrust concerns.15
11 C. Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, (2003) 87 RAND Journal of  
Economics, 391.
12 Ibid., pp. 397–408. Shapiro’s theory has, however, been criticised, because it cannot 
be applied to all types of  agreements. See P. Régibeau, “Pay-for-Delay”: What Do We 
Disagree On? 9(2) Competition Policy International, 2013, p. 122.
13 Ibid., p. 122.
14 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of  1984, Public Law 98/417.
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III. The Lundbeck 
case: Background
9. On  8 September 2016, the General Court (GC) 
ruled in Lundbeck that competition law rules—namely, 
Article  101 TFEU—apply to patent settlement agree-
ments with reverse payment, and that these should 
be considered restrictions of competition by object.16 
Lundbeck is a Danish pharmaceutical company which 
manufactures citalopram, a blockbuster antidepressant. 
The protection afforded by the firm’s compound patent 
had expired by 2002 in most countries, but over time 
the company developed other more effective processes 
for the production of citalopram. Nevertheless, several 
generic producers were preparing their entry into the 
market. Lundbeck claimed an infringement of its intel-
lectual property (IP) rights and concluded six agreements 
concerning citalopram with four generic manufacturers 
active in the production and/or sale of generic medicinal 
products. In those agreements, the generic producers 
committed not to enter the market, and Lundbeck 
offered substantial payments in return. 
10.  The GC upheld the European Commission’s 
approach to pay-for-delay agreements. In fact, in the 
cases Fentanyl and Servier the Commission had also 
applied EU competition law provisions to those agree-
ments.17 In Lundbeck, it found that the originator firm 
and the generic producers were at least potential compet-
itors in the European Economic Area (EEA). Moreover, 
the agreement involved making significant payments to 
the generic producers, which were approximately equiva-
lent to the profits expected with the successful entry of the 
generics into the market. It also restricted market entry 
for generic producers. As a result, the agreement infringed 
Article  101 TFEU, and the Commission imposed fines 
on all the firms involved. The decision was upheld by 
the GC in September 2016 and, on 18 November 2016, 
Lundbeck filed an appeal before the Court of Justice 
against the judgment of the GC.18
11.  It should be noted, however, that the principle laid 
down by the GC in the Lundbeck case is that reverse 
payments are not always problematic. This is particularly 
the case when that payment is linked to the strength of the 
patent and does not intend to delay the market entry of 
generics.19 That was also the stand taken by the Commis-
sion in the Annual Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry, which 
referred agreements with limitation on generic entry with 
value transfer as the only ones raising antitrust concerns. 
Other types of settlements, such as agreements with no 
limitation on generic entry—so that the generic firm can 
16 H. Lundbeck A/S and Lundbeck Ltd v. European Commission, Case T-472/13, 8 September 
2016. 
17 Case AT.39685 — Fentanyl, and case AT.39612 — Perindopril (Servier).
18 Case  C-591/16 P, Appeal brought by H. Lundbeck A/S, Lundbeck Ltd against the 
judgment of  the General Court (Ninth Chamber).
19 Lundbeck judgment, § 350.
enter the market freely—or agreements with limitation on 
generics entry without value transfer from the originator 
firm—for instance, allowing the generic firm to distribute 
the drugs of the originator—were not problematic.20
12. Therefore, both the Commission and the GC focused 
principally on the size of the payments, seemingly leaning 
on the lessons of the probabilistic patent rights theory. 
Large reverse payments, unexpectedly high litigation 
costs and the generic firms’ expected market profit, were 
considered proof that the parties believed the patent was 
likely to be invalid or at least not infringed by the generic 
manufacturers, and the main goal of the agreement was 
the exclusion of potential competitors.21 In other words, 
when the reverse payment amount exceeds the origina-
tor’s anticipated litigation costs, it will not only delay 
the expected market entry of the generic firm, but will 
also exceed “the probabilistic patent scope according to 
the patent holder’s own probability estimate.”22 This test 
would have the advantage of not requiring an assess-
ment of the patent’s merits, which is extremely hard 
for antitrust authorities, while providing an easy and 
practical criterion of legality.
13.  Taking this test into account, and considering that 
Lundbeck’s agreements were similar to market-sharing 
deals,23 the GC applied Article  101(1) TFEU. The 
Court concluded that those agreements were restric-
tive of competition by object.24 Since the originator 
firm blocked all competition during a specified period, 
the arrangements allocated time instead of a territory 
(as in traditional market-sharing).25 The examination of 
the hypothetical counterfactual scenario was considered 
irrelevant in casu, as the CG did not find it necessary to 
analyse the effects of the agreements on the market under 
Article 101(1), and the legal exception of Article 101(3) 
TFEU was found to be inapplicable.26
20 European Commission, 6th Report on the Monitoring of  Patent Settlements (period: 
January–December 2014), 2 December 2015.
21 C. Shapiro, Antitrust Analysis of  Patent Settlements Between Rivals, Antitrust Magazine, 
2003, pp. 70–77, at p. 72.
22 E. Elhauge and A. Krueger, Solving the Patent Settlement Puzzle, 91 Texas Law Review, 
2012, p. 282.
23 The uncertainty of  patent litigation was replaced by the certainty of  delaying generic 
entry against a large payment.
24 Lundbeck judgment, §§  161, 355. For a critical view of  this solution, see R.  Subiotto 
QC and J. Figus Diaz, Lundbeck v Commission: Reverse Payment Patent Settlements as 
Restrictions of  Competition by Object, 8(1) Journal of  European Competition Law & 
Practice, 2017, p. 27.
25 See FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc. et al., Supreme Court, No. 12-416, On Writ of  
Certiorari to the US Court of  Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Brief  Amicus Curiae. 
January 29, 2013. See, however, K. D. McDonald noting that the mere “existence of  the 
patent right destroys any analogy with market division.” K. D. McDonald, Because I Said So: 
On the Competitive Rationale of  FTC v. Actavis, 28(1) Antitrust, 2013, p. 37.


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































14.  Ruling that pay-for-delay agreements are restric-
tions of competition by object was only possible because 
the GC considered generic producers and Lundbeck to 
be potential competitors. According to the court, the 
generic firms had real concrete possibilities and capacity 
to enter the market and to compete with established 
undertakings.27 Their entry was an economically viable 
strategy, supported by factual evidence. In fact, the 
generic producers had taken steps, before the expiry date 
of the patent, to develop viable production processes and 
obtain marketing authorisations, and they had already 
concluded contracts for the supply of generic products.28 
As confirmed by the GC, potential competition takes 
place in two phases in the pharmaceutical sector. The first 
phase may start several years before patent expiry on an 
active pharmaceutical ingredient (API), when generic 
firms start developing viable production processes. In the 
second phase, generic firms prepare for actual market 
entry by making applications for marketing authori-
sations (MAs) and establishing distribution networks. 
Lundbeck’s process patents were not, therefore, capable 
of blocking all possibilities of market entry open to the 
generic firms.
15. As the GC mentioned in that case, according to the 
undertakings involved the crystallisation patent on which 
Lundbeck relied in order to close the market entry in 
the United Kingdom had a good chance (around 60%) 
of being held invalid by a court.29 In addition, generic 
producers did not consider the product as novel. Generic 
undertakings could thus “enter the market ʻat risk,’”30 
and this type of conduct, which has been criticised for 
endorsing potentially unlawful conduct,31 should not be 
considered an infringement of patent law according to 
the GC. 
27 Ibid., § 128.
28 Ibid., §§ 100, 104, 131.
29 Ibid., §§ 122, 254.
30 Ibid., §§ 96, 281.
31 S. Lawrence, E. Bond, and M. Hunt, Survey – Genentech, Lundbeck, Paramount and 
Others: A Survey of  Cases at the Intersection Between Competition Law and IP Law in the 
Past Year, 8(1) Journal of  European Competition Law & Practice, 2017, p. 66.
V. The Lundbeck 
approach in the light 
of the previous praxis 
on exclusive rights: 
What is new?
16.  The solution held by the GC in the Lundbeck case 
has been criticised for being seemingly at odds with 
the approaches followed by the Commission and the 
EU courts in their previous decisions.32 The Commis-
sion had already decided that generic firms could not 
enter the market in a sustainable way if  patent litiga-
tion was ongoing.33 The GC, on its part, had already 
decided in cases involving exclusive rights that potential 
competition could be set aside. This appears to be the 
case, for instance, in E.ON Ruhrgas,34 which dealt with 
market-sharing agreements between energy distribution 
companies by which the undertakings involved agreed 
not to supply electricity or gas in each other’s territories. 
Here, the GC appeared to suggest that firms could not 
be considered potential competitors if  there were terri-
torial monopolies granted by the State. In Lundbeck, 
however, the GC pointed out that the E.ON Ruhrgas case 
should be seen as a totally different matter. In the latter 
case the national legislation created a de facto monopoly, 
and undertakings were not treated as potential competi-
tors because market entry was not an economically viable 
strategy. Nonetheless, in Lundbeck the legal monopoly 
granted to the patent holder was not considered suffi-
cient to block the potential entrance of generic firms into 
the market.35
17.  Following this logic, it would seem that not all 
exclusive rights can be considered equal as regards 
potential competition. While some exclusive rights 
granted by the State exclude potential competition, 
the validity of others—such as patents—is uncertain. 
If the outcome of patent litigation is unclear, the patent 
holder does not have the right to exclude rivals who are 
allegedly infringing competition (the alternative could be 
to seek a preliminary injunction).36 To put it differently, 
although there is a presumption of patent validity, there 
is no certainty as to the result of the patent litigation. 
Any decision on that issue would consequently be purely 
speculative. On the other hand, it has been suggested that 
potential competition could not exist where market entry 
depends on the infringement of an intellectual property 
right. For example, in the Teva/Cephalon case, as the 
32 Ibid., p. 70.
33 See Case No. COMP/M.6258 – Teva/Cephalon.
34 Case T-360/09 E.ON Ruhrgas and E.ON v. Commission ECLI:EU:T:2012:332, § 84.
35 Ibid., §§ 100 and 816.
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patent litigation was ongoing, the Commission assumed 
that the generic firms could not have entered the market 
in a sustainable way.37 A similar approach was followed 
by the Commission in the Guidelines on the applica-
tion of Article 101 TFEU to technology transfer agree-
ments, which confirmed that the possibility that existing 
IP rights act as a barrier to entry should be considered. 
The  licensee is not a potential competitor if  it cannot 
enter the market without infringing the IP rights of the 
other party.38
18. The GC ignored all these arguments and clarified that 
Lundbeck’s patents were not considered to constitute a 
barrier to entry. Therefore, potential competition may 
exist before the expiry of a patent, as the Court of Justice 
had already established in the AstraZeneca judgment.39 
Although the solution presented has been criticised for 
rendering the presumption of validity afforded to patents 
by statute meaningless,40 the strength or weakness of 
the patent is still relevant. In fact, the weakness of the 
patent is evidenced when the originator firm is paying 
the generic firm large amounts of cash to avoid the risk 
of litigation. Large reverse payments are thus incon-
sistent with a claim by the patent holder that its patent 
would probably be found valid if  litigated, and should be 
presumed to be anticompetitive. 
19.  Finally, it should be mentioned that the Lundbeck 
analysis set aside the approach taken in the Windsurfing 
case,41 which accepted the scope of the patent test. 
This test is somewhat problematic from the point of view 
of competition law, as it leads to the presumption that 
the generic product infringes the patent when the issue 
was not decided. Moreover, it suggests that patents are 
immune to antitrust laws. Yet the case law of the Court 
of Justice followed a quite different approach and never 
exempted patent settlements from antitrust scrutiny.42 
The scope of a patent is not, it appears, immune to 
antitrust laws; on the contrary, antitrust laws and patent 
laws should work together to define that scope. Setting 
aside the scope of the patent test, and allowing competi-
tion law to intervene along with patent law in the defini-
tion of the scope of the patent, would seem like the best 
solution.
20. The approach followed by the GC in the Lundbeck 
case is therefore coherent with the dominant economic 
literature and particularly with the theory of probabil-
istic patent rights. In fact, the GC acknowledged the 
uncertainties inherent to the patent system, as patents are 
issued with little examination and they will probably be 
invalid. It held that “the presumption of validity cannot be 
37 Teva/Cephalon, § 98.
38 Communication from the Commission, Guidelines on the application of  Article 101 of  
the Treaty on the Functioning of  the European Union to technology transfer agreements, 
(2014) C89/03, §§ 129-132.
39 T-321/05 AstraZeneca v. Commission, ECLI: EU:T:2010:266, §§ 121, 163.
40 K. D. McDonald (2013) above, p. 74. 
41 C-193/83 Windsurfing International v. Commission, 193/83, ECLI: EU:C:1986:75, § 26.
42 C-65/86 Bayer and Maschinenfabrik Hennecke, ECLI: EU:C:1988:448.
equated with a presumption of illegality of generic products 
validly placed on the market which the patent holder deems 
to be infringing the patent” and that “ʻat risk’ entry is not 
unlawful in itself.’”43 Moreover, the GC has relied in the 
previous case law of the Court of Justice and confirmed 
that, given the economic and legal context, “there are real 
concrete possibilities for the undertakings concerned to 
compete among themselves or for a new competitor to enter 
the relevant market.”44 Furthermore, the GC decided that 
there is a high probability that generic firms would prevail 
in litigation: the parties “estimated the probability that its 
crystallisation patent would be held invalid at 50 to 60 per 
cent.”45 In addition, the GC appears to have accepted that 
the “size of a reverse payment may constitute an indicator 
of the strength or weakness of a patent, as perceived by 
the parties to the agreements,”46 and that the higher the 
originator firm estimates the chances of its patent being 
found invalid, “the more money it will be willing to pay the 
generic undertakings to avoid that risk.”47
21. In conclusion, the court held that it was the “dispropor-
tionate nature of such payments,” combined with several 
other factors, that led to the finding that the agreements at 
issue had as their object the restriction of competition.48 
Moreover, the transfer of value “replaces the autonomous 
assessment, by the parties, of the strength of the originator 
undertaking’s patents and the assessment of their chances 
of succeeding in potential litigation based on those patents 
or concerning their validity.”49 This means that the GC, 
without entering into an assessment of the validity of the 
patent, applied a test which is easy to perform,50 bene-
fiting from the theoretical framework developed in the 
context of probabilistic patent rights.51
22. To fully understand the Lundbeck judgment, a brief  
reference to the approach taken in the United States is 
necessary. Since a detailed analysis is provided elsewhere 
in this on-topic paper,52 the focus here will be simply on 
some developments that are of particular relevance to 
this discussion. After a long period of inconsistent case 
law and conflicting views between the FTC and some 
courts, the Supreme Court held in Federal Trade Commis-
sion v. Actavis that large payments made to a generic firm 
to prevent it from entering the market infringed antitrust 
rules, subject to a rule of reason analysis. This is so even 






49 Ibid., §§ 354 and 360.
50 On the perception of  the probabilistic patents by the GC, see I. Lianos and V. Korah with 
P. Siciliani, Competition Law: Analysis, Cases and Materials (Hart, 2017), Chapter 13. 
51 It should also be noted that the GC follows the principle that competition law only 
protects lawful competition, and is not intended to protect firms that might infringe IP 
rights when entering into the market. As Judge Posner put it, “[w]e do not want an efficient 
market in stolen goods.” Cf. R. A. Posner, Economic Analysis of  Law, 5th ed. 1998, 91.
52 K. Fournier, The Notion of  “Potential Competitor” in US Antitrust Enforcement: Prag-
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if  the patent settlement is within the scope of the patent, 
excluding only products allegedly infringing a presump-
tively valid patent. According to the Supreme Court, 
the presence of a significant reverse payment in a patent 
settlement agreement can provide a “workable surrogate 
for the weakness of a patent, without a court having to carry 
out a detailed analysis of the validity of that patent.”53 
The Supreme Court thus rejected both the scope of the 
patent test and the quick look test.54 It left, however, 
several questions unanswered. For instance, it did not 
clarify whether reverse payments should also include 
value transfer, such as distribution or licence agreements, 
and it did not detail when a payment is large and unjusti-
fied, or how to assess the benefits of the settlement.
23.  Some of these issues were addressed by the Third 
Circuit Court in the King Drug decision in June 2015, 
and the First Circuit Court in the Loestrin decision of 
February 2016. Those judgments confirmed that the 
principle laid down in Actavis can be applied to payments 
in forms other than cash. The Supreme Court was asked 
to review and reverse the Third Circuit’s unanimous panel 
decision in King Drug, which considered that a no-au-
thorised generic deal (that is to say, the originator firm 
agrees not to launch its own authorised-generic alterna-
tive when the first generic company begins to compete) 
can be considered a transfer of value to the generic firm 
and can be scrutinised under antitrust law.55
24. Notwithstanding the questions left unanswered, the 
approach followed in Actavis also takes into account 
the probabilistic patent rights theory, and the results 
achieved are not very different from those obtained in the 
EU context. In fact, in spite of the different regulatory 
context, the solution proposed by the GC in Lundbeck is 
consistent with the one followed by the Supreme Court: 
both considered that patent settlements with a high level 
of value transfer should be subject to antitrust scrutiny, 
setting aside the scope of the patent test, and both 
insisted on the uncertainties of this type of IP rights and 
the specificities of the pharmaceutical sector, calling into 
the equation the probabilistic patent rights theory.
53 Judgment of  the Supreme Court of  the United States of  17 June 2013, Federal Trade 
Commission v. Actavis, 570 U.S. (2013).
54 Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis Inc. et al. Certiorari to the United States Court of  
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, p.  122. See also Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 
F.3d  1065, 1076 (11th Cir. 2005), which proposed a test of  presumptive illegality 
followed by a “quick-look” analysis. 
55 King Drug Company of  Florence, Inc. v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d  388 (3d 
Cir. June 26, 2015). and Rochester Drug Co-Operative, Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Co. (In re 
Loestrin  24 FE Antirust Litig.), 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS  3049 (1st Cir. February 22, 
2016).
VI. Conclusion
25. The specific solution followed in the Lundbeck case 
for pay-for-delay agreements in the pharmaceutical 
sector must be considered through the lens of prob-
abilistic patents. The GC appears to propose a new 
approach regarding to the concept of potential competi-
tors. It applied Article 101 TFEU to pay-for-delay agree-
ments and explained that the legal monopoly granted to 
the patent holder will not exclude potential competition 
if  generic firms have the ability and capacity, in a short 
period of time, to enter the market. In fact, potential 
competition may exist even before the exerted patent has 
expired. Additionally, apparently inspired by the prob-
abilistic patent rights theory, the GC moved away from 
the traditional view of potential competitor, and decided 
that generic firms could be potential competitors, if  there 
was a high probability that they would prevail in litiga-
tion. Finally, the GC accepted that the existence of large 
reverse payments should be seen as an indicator of the 
weakness of the patent and of the anticompetitive nature 
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Senior Vice President, Compass Lexecon, Hong Kong
I. Introduction
1. The recent decision in the Lundbeck1 case before the 
General Court depended critically on the scope of the 
concepts of “potential competition” and “potential 
competitor.” This paper considers the insights that 
economics can bring to the question of how we might 
think about how to define and delineate these concepts, 
including by reference to contestable markets ideas, which 
are the focus of a section of this paper and are explained 
in some detail below. It also makes some suggestions 
regarding possible future developments in these concepts 
in the courts, and how competition practitioners might 
go about sharpening the way these concepts are presented 
and argued. 
II. The Lundbeck 
case and the 
concept of potential 
competitor
2.  The case law and precise circumstances of the 
Lundbeck case have been recounted in detail elsewhere: in 
the Commission decision on this case; in the judgment of 
the General Court; and in other papers in this On-Topic 
edition2.  I will therefore not recount these circumstances 
in significant detail afresh here. It is worthwhile, however, 
to note several key aspects of the case. 
3.  Lundbeck, a Danish pharmaceutical company, held 
patents in the active pharmaceutical ingredient and two 
original production processes concerning the antide-
pressant drug citalopram. As these patents approached 
expiry, Lundbeck concluded a series of settlement 
1 Case T-472/13 H. Lundbeck A/S and Lundbeck Ltd v. European Commission (“Lundbeck”).
2 See e.g. N. Dunne, Why Protect Potential Competition? Concurrences No. 2-1017, in the 
same On-Topic as this paper.
agreements (“the agreements”) with four generic manu-
facturers, under which Lundbeck made substantial 
payments to each of the generic companies, and in conse-
quence of which the generic companies agreed not to 
enter the citalopram market for a defined period. Agree-
ments of this kind had previously attracted the attention 
of the United States antitrust agencies in the “pay-for-
delay” cases. With its Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry of 
2009 forming the backdrop and providing some guiding 
principles,3 the European Commission in 2013 found the 
agreements to have contravened Article 101 TFEU as a 
restriction of competition by object.4 Lundbeck appealed 
the Commission’s decision, and in 2016 the General 
Court upheld the Commission decision.5 
4.  A core question was whether an agreement with a 
producer who is not in the market, but who might be in 
the market as a “potential competitor,” could be consid-
ered to be an anticompetitive agreement for the purposes 
of 101 TFEU. As a threshold issue, Article  101 is not 
triggered unless the parties to the agreements are actual 
or potential competitors. A fundamental question for the 
court therefore was whether the generic producers, who 
had not yet entered the market, were potential compet-
itors for the purposes of Article  101. If  these generic 
producers were found to be potential competitors in the 
relevant economic and legal context, this would lead to 
the conclusion that the agreements were restrictive of 
competition by object in that they constituted cartel-like 
arrangements without a reasonable objective purpose 
other than the restriction of competition.
5.  The Court drew on existing case law to outline the 
key jurisprudential principles regarding the existence of 
potential competition and competitors.6 The analysis of 
competition in a market must include existing competi-
tion and also potential competition to determine whether 
“there are real concrete possibilities for the undertakings 
concerned to compete among themselves or for a new 
3 Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Report
4 COMP/AT.39226 — Lundbeck. 
5 Lundbeck.
6 Case  T-360/09 E.ON Ruhrgas and E.ON v. Commission; Cases  T-374/94, T-375/94, 
T-384/94 and T-388/94 European Night Services and Others v. Commission; Case T-461/07 
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competitor to enter the relevant market and compete with 
established undertakings” in light of the structure of the 
market and its economic and legal context. 7 This means 
that, in order to determine whether an enterprise is a 
potential competitor, the Commission must determine if, 
in the absence of the agreement, “there would have been 
real concrete possibilities” for the enterprise to enter the 
market and to compete with the existing market partici-
pants.8 In other words, the agreement must be assessed 
against the counterfactual—what would have happened 
in the absence of the agreement? Highly relevant therefore 
is whether the supposed potential competitor had the 






6.  So what is potential competition, and who is a 
potential competitor? The Court’s judgment and the 
surrounding case law provide helpful guidance in this 
respect. However, the discipline of economics in compe-
tition enforcement has long considered the question of 
potential competition for a variety of purposes, including 
for mergers clearances among other reasons. This section 
outlines some relevant aspects of the economics of 
potential competition. 
7. It is widely accepted that competition law is to a signif-
icant extent an economic law, and that many of the 
substantive jurisprudential concepts in modern competi-
tion law are arguably need to be understood through a lens 
of economic reasoning.10 Economic reasoning underpins 
areas of competition law ranging from modern merger 
analysis, the analysis of vertical agreements, abuse of 
dominance/monopolization, and the legal presumption 
that cartels inherently cause harm to competition. In this 
sense, John Maynard Keynes’s famous observation that 
“[p]ractical men who believe themselves to be quite exempt 
from any intellectual influence, are usually the slaves of 
7 Lundbeck, § 99. 
8 Lundbeck, § 100.
9 Lundbeck, § 101.
10 The following may be of  interest to the reader with regard to this broader development 
which goes beyond the scope of  this paper: A. Gavil, W. Kovacic, J. Baker, and J. Wright, 
Cases, Concepts and Problems in Competition Policy, 3rd ed. (West Academic Publishing, 
2017); P. Areeda, L. Kaplow, and A. Edlin, Antitrust Analysis: Problems, Texts, and Cases, 
7th ed. (Aspen Publishers, 2013); J. Kwoka and L. White, The Antitrust Revolution, 6th 
ed. (Oxford University Press, 2013); R. Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspec-
tive (University of  Chicago Press, 1976); E. Elhauge and D. Gerardin, Global Competi-
tion Law and Economics, 2nd ed. (Hart Publishing, 2011); L. Kaplow, Antitrust, Law & 
Economics, and the Courts, 50 Law and Contemporary Problems, 1987, pp. 181–216.
some defunct economist,”11 may in the context of modern 
competition law, well have been expressed as “compe-
tition practitioners who believe themselves to be quite 
exempt from any economic influence, are usually the 
slaves of some defunct economist.” From this perspec-
tive, it is valuable to consider how the body of economics 
views the concepts of potential competition, and 
therefore what constitutes a potential competitor. 
8.  Economics has understood the importance of 
potential competition as a mechanism that influences the 
behaviour of a market since at least the 1950s. Barriers 
to entry were arguably the first of many ways in which 
potential competition entered competition analysis 
by way of the economic literature. Joe Bain, a founder 
of the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) school 
of  thought in industrial organization, first proposed 
and tested barriers to entry as a central determinant of 
industry performance.12 The concept that low barriers 
to entry facilitate competitive entry in response to high 
profits, and thereby discipline market incumbents, first 
comes to us from Bain’s and other contemporary works. 
Bain’s core conclusion that entry barriers are a critical 
factor in determining the competitive outcomes in an 
industry has long been familiar to competition practi-
tioners everywhere. The discipline of potential competi-
tion is implicitly (or explicitly) recognized every time a 
merger clearance filing discusses barriers to entry and 
potential entrants into a market as a determinant of the 
post-merger level of competition. 
9.  Further important developments in game theory, in 
particular in dynamic games, built on these foundations 
to provide ever more sophisticated structures for under-
standing how existing competitors react to the threat of 
new competition, and how potential new competition may 
discipline existing market participants.13 In particular, 
our understanding of the different categories of entry 
barriers has become enriched in practical competition 
law and economics in step with the progressive enrich-
ment of the literature in this field. In particular, we now 
have a sophisticated understanding of the ways in which 
different mechanisms such as switching costs, lock-in 
effects and network externalities can influence consumers 
by being a source of “stickiness” to existing suppliers 
that makes entry for a potential market contestant more 
difficult, and thereby can weaken the discipline that entry 
potentially exercises on the market. 
11 J. M. Keynes, General Theory of  Employment, Interest and Money (London: MacMillan, 
1936).
12 J. Bain, Economies of  Scale, Concentration and the Condition of  Entry in Twenty Manu-
facturing Industries, American Economic Review, 44(1), 1954, pp. 15–39; J. Bain, Condi-
tions of  Entry and the Emergence of  Monopoly, in E. H. Chamberlin (ed.), Monopoly and 
Competition and Their Regulation (Macmillan, 1954), pp. 215–41; J. Bain, Chamberlin’s 
Impact on Microeconomic Theory, in R. Kuenne (ed.), Monopolistic Competition Theory 
(John Wiley, 1967).
13 See, for instance, J. Tirole, The Theory of  Industrial Organization (MIT Press, 1988); 
M. Motta, Competition Policy: Theory and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2004); 
and P. Belleflamme and M. Peitz Industrial Organization: Markets and Strategies, 2nd ed. 
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10.  An important step in our modern understanding 
of potential competition, and a useful further stepping 
stone in understanding the importance of entry barriers, 
is the concept of contestable markets first developed in 
1982.14 This concept has been influential in expanding our 
understanding of the possible role of potential compe-
tition in influencing the behaviour of existing partici-
pants in a market. Furthermore, the critique and limits 
of this concept have helped us to focus on the conditions 
in which potential competitors will discipline a market 
and the conditions in which they will not. These condi-
tions in turn have important implications for who may be 
a potential competitor for the purposes of Lundbeck and 
similar cases. 
11.  The contestable markets hypothesis states that a 
market outcome is sustainable when no new firm (using 
existing technology) can profitably enter the market by 
offering lower prices than the incumbents and serving 
some or all of the existing demand at the new, lower 
prices. A perfectly contestable market is a market which 
is only in market equilibrium when the market outcome 
is sustainable. In consequence, the equilibrium market 
outcome in a perfectly contestable market is that total 
costs will equal total revenues, that is, total market profits 
will be zero. If  prices are such that revenues exceed costs, 
a new firm could profitably enter at lower prices, meaning 
that the prices are not sustainable but will instead be 
driven down and confined to a sustainable level, which 
is where revenues equal costs. In a market served by a 
monopoly (for instance a natural monopoly), this results 
in prices being equal to average costs—the outcome in 
essence sought by many natural monopoly regulatory 
regimes. In a contestable market served by several firms, 
prices will be constrained by free entry to being equal to 
marginal costs, since any deviation in price will create 
opportunities for firms profitably to adjust their prices 
and outputs and thus will not be stable. This market 
outcome therefore mimics the outcome achieved in 
perfectly competitive markets. 
12.  This is a striking result. In a world characterized 
by perfectly contestable markets, potential competi-
tion disciplines all such markets to achieve the socially 
desirable outcome, including in natural monopoly 
markets. In such a world, competition authorities would 
have little to do, because potential competition is all-dis-
ciplining—and potential competitors would be a very 
wide category indeed. 
13.  However, the conditions under which markets are 
perfectly contestable are strong. This places important 
limits on the application of contestable markets concepts 
and conclusions, which in turn suggests important limits 
on who should be considered a potential competitor. 
The strongest form of a perfectly contestable market 
occurs where entry and exit can happen freely and imme-
diately. Under those conditions, no firm (including a 
monopoly) can raise prices above the competitive level 
14 W. Baumol, J. Panzar and R. Willig, Contestable Markets and the Theory of  Industrial 
Structure (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1982). 
because immediate and free entry would immediately 
defeat the price rise.15 However, most industries have 
some, even if  modest, barriers to entry. In the generally 
realistic situation where there are barriers to entry, it is 
important how quickly the incumbents’ prices can move, 
in particular in response to entry. Where existing market 
participants’ prices are restrained to responding more 
slowly than entry can take place, the perfectly contestable 
market outcome can be reproduced, because incumbent 
firms will have similar incentives not to raise prices in a 
way that would trigger entry.16 However, where prices can 
respond more quickly than entry can take place, incum-
bents can maintain profitable prices without similar disci-
pline from the fear of immediate entry, as they can reduce 
prices sufficiently quickly as soon as they see entry taking 
place and in advance of the entry being completed.17 
14. These restrictions on the applicability of contestable 
markets concepts have important consequences for the 
analysis of potential competition. Potential competition 
from potential entrants has a strong restraining effect on 
existing players’ market behaviour when entry is free and 
immediate, or when there are modest barriers to entry 
and entry can take place more quickly than incumbents 
can adjust their prices. In the absence of these conditions, 
the potential competition from entrants is weakened. 
Of particular importance is the existence of sunk costs. 
The absence of entry barriers includes, in the well-
known way, the absence of sunk costs (costs that are not 
recoverable) by entrants. Where there are sunk costs (or 
other entry barriers), and where incumbents’ prices can 
adjust sufficiently freely, the contestable markets hypoth-
esis breaks down, and the market discipline exerted by 
potential entrants is correspondingly weakened. This 
in turn arguably has important consequences for the 
analysis of potential competition and potential competi-
tors; I now turn to this discussion. 
IV. Implications for 
the jurisprudence and 
concluding words
15.  The Court in Lundbeck has provided helpful 
guidance regarding the legal threshold of what consti-
tutes “potential competition” and therefore a “potential 
competitor.” A potential competitor is a potential market 
participant who has “real concrete possibilities” of 
entering the market. However, this definition, when taken 
15 W. Baumol and R. Willig, On the Theory of  Perfectly-Contestable Markets, in 
J.  E.  Stiglitz and F. Mathewson (eds.), New Developments in the Analysis of  Market 
Structure (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1986), pp. 339–65. 
16 Ibid.
17 J. Farrell, How Effective is Potential Competition?, Economics Letters, 20, 1986, pp. 
67–70; R. J. Gilbert and R. G. Harris, Competition with Lumpy Investment, RAND 
Journal of  Economics, 15, 1984, pp. 197–212; and R. J. Gilbert, Preemptive Competi-
tion, In J. E. Stiglitz and F. Mathewson (eds.), New Developments in the Analysis of  Market 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































50 Concurrences N° 2-2017 I On-Topic I The Lundbeck case and the concept of potential competition
on its own, and no matter how helpful it is, risks being 
rather amorphous. As with many other areas of compe-
tition law, economics can provide sharper guiding lines 
regarding what potential entrant into a market should, or 
should not be considered a “potential competitor.” 
16.  The economic literature outlined above has poten-
tially important implications for the potential competitor 
analysis. A potential market entrant in the presence of 
barriers to entry and where prices can move more rapidly 
than entry takes place will not exert similar market disci-
pline on incumbents as in a situation where entry is free 
and immediate. These notions are deeply entrenched in 
modern mergers analysis, in particular in respect to the 
relevance of entry. The United States Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines state that “[a] merger is not likely to enhance 
market power if entry into the market is so easy that the 
merged firm and its remaining rivals in the market, either 
unilaterally or collectively, could not profitably raise price 
or otherwise reduce competition compared to the level that 
would prevail in the absence of the merger. Entry is that 
easy if entry would be timely, likely, and sufficient in its 
magnitude, character, and scope to deter or counteract the 
competitive effects of concern.”18
17. This demonstrates the importance of the likelihood and 
the timeliness of entry in constraining market behaviour 
in the context of mergers analysis, and is consistent with 
the economic literature. Very similarly, the EU Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines provide that “for entry to be consid-
ered a sufficient competitive constraint on the merging 
parties, it must be shown to be likely, timely and sufficient to 
deter or defeat any potential anti-competitive effects of the 
merger,”19 and go on to provide a great wealth of helpful 
and nuanced detail around these core criteria.
18.  Consider the analysis of a merger where there is a 
potential entrant in the presence of high barriers to entry. 
Such a potential entrant may be judged to be unlikely 
to exert appreciable competitive discipline on a market 
because it would find it difficult to enter the market—
these are the lessons from bodies of economics including 
those I have outlined above. In such a case, a merger would 
be unlikely to be cleared merely because of the existence 
of such an unlikely potential entrant. The likelihood of 
that potential entrant exerting sufficient potential compe-
tition, and therefore of being an appreciable potential 
competitor, would probably be judged to be too remote. 
18 US Department of  Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (2010), Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines, Washington, D.C., p. 28. 
19 European Commission, Guidelines on the Assessment of  Horizontal Mergers under the 
Council Regulation on the Control of  Concentrations between Undertakings (2004) 
C31/03.
19.  Then consider the same potential entrant, in an 
analogous market in the presence of the same high 
entry barriers, but in the context of a Lundbeck-style 
case. Would that potential entrant be considered to be 
a potential competitor in a Lundbeck-style case? Under 
the court’s analysis in Lundbeck, it would seem that it 
would: it would seem that this potential entrant might 
well be considered a “potential competitor” if  a mere 
“real concrete possibility” of entry exists, notwith-
standing the high barriers to entry. However, in a 
merger case involving the same market and the same 
potential entrant, the entrant might well be discounted 
as imposing the discipline of potential competition if  the 
entry is “concretely possible” but not “likely,” and would 
therefore not be considered a likely “potential compet-
itor” in this analogous situation. 
20. One can see from this juxtaposition of scenarios that 
there exists the possibility for analytical and doctrinal 
inconsistency arising from analogous fact scenarios, 
in the context of searching for the same concept of 
potential competition and potential competitor, but 
when applied to different competition law provisions. 
In future decisions involving potential competition and 
competitors, the courts may wish to consider empha-
sizing doctrinal consistency across these concepts, 
including considering how these comparable concepts 
are applied in the well-established mergers jurisprudence 
and practice. 
21. On the other side of the equation, parties and their 
legal representatives facing Lundbeck-style issues may 
wish to draw on economic analysis of potential compe-
tition to ground their positions on solid foundations. 
Competition authorities and courts increasingly look 
to rigorous economic analysis in merger clearance, 
abuse of dominance, vertical restrictions, and other 
cases involving economic effects. Potential competition 
is a concept as solidly grounded in economic analysis 
as those other areas of competition, meaning that the 
analysis of whether a party is a potential competitor is 
equally amenable to economic thought and argument. 
The General Court has spoken, but this need not be 
the final word. It is entirely feasible that future courts 
will seek a jurisprudence of potential competition that 
displays greater doctrinal consistency and convergence 
with other areas of competition law: a consistency that 
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